

Building Peace through Human Security: A Transformational Agenda

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The notion of peace building corresponds closely to human security. Peace researchers and allied scholarship in conflict resolution have long emphasized a broader meaning of peace and security, which could deal with the generic causes of conflict. The concept of basic human needs and structural violence emphasizing oppression and exclusion as generic causes of violent conflict, are a platform equipped for the discourse on human security. Related to the human security discourse is the concept of non-traditional security (NTS). This new trajectory highlights non-military threats, which transcend national borders, seen as a greater challenge to peace and stability than the conventional threats of interstate wars and conflicts.

These developments have left a transformational impact on the traditionally dominant approaches to security. The interpretation of Security – so critical in organizing public priorities and legitimizing the use of force- has been traditionally a preserve of the dominant political and strategic community. Thus it has been defined in exclusive reference to the state's ability to counter external threats to its vital interests and values. Such militaristic and state-centric notion of security was reinforced by the Cold War overlay which never allowed the focus to shift from national security issues.

However the 'post-bipolar renaissance' in security thinking attributed to such challenges as the violent upsurge of ethno-nationalism, collapsing states, large migrations across frontiers, transnational crimes and health hazards, human rights violations, gender and environmental concerns, food and water security etc. These societal threats arising in any part of the world have portents for threatening global security in today's integrated and globalized world.

Evidently the challenges of the twenty-first century necessitate an expanded notion of security, which is not restricted to the well being of the state but takes care of basic security needs of the citizens residing therein. No wonder the construction of human security as an alternate discourse has attracted the widest interest among the policy makers, scholars, and civil society actors. It makes a fundamental transference in the security analysis by bringing people and society within the

template of security. Echoing this imperative, a leading public figure in India aptly suggested that while ‘frontiers of a State are important but so are frontiers of human dignity.’

Freedom from Fear / Want

In 1994, the Human Development Report focused explicitly on human security and defined it around two aspects: freedom from fear and freedom from want, which include safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repressions, and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. The Report identified five steps: a human development conception with emphasis on equity, sustainability, and grassroots participation; a peace dividend to underwrite the broader agenda of human security; a new partnership between North and South based on justice and equitable access to global market opportunities and economic restructuring; a new framework of global governance built on reform of international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and the United Nations; and finally, a growing role for global civil society.

Further, the UNDP Report listed seven “components,” or specific values of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. Thus, in policy terms human security is an integrated, sustainable, comprehensive security from fear, conflict, ignorance, poverty, social and cultural deprivation, and hunger, resting upon positive and negative freedoms. At many levels, these human security arguments share a common genealogy with other much-recognized concepts as human development and human rights. Thus human security is brother and sister to human development as it provides the sheltering environment for human development, the social peace and freedom from fear that make development practical. The UNDP Reports and the subsequent *Human Security Now* both admit that the threats to human security at the societal level are often the root causes of protracted internal violence and thus recommend peace-building as the support for divided societies in their efforts to prevent internal threats to human security.

The Japanese Government defined human security, as “[t]he preservation and protection of the life and dignity of individual human beings . . . that . . . can be ensured only when the individual is confident of a life free of fear and free of want.” However, the middle powers like Canada & Norway linked human security more explicitly to human rights and humanitarian law and critiqued the UNDP version “for focusing too much on threats associated with underdevelopment at the expense of human insecurity resulting from violent conflict.”

Paradoxes of Human Security:

The post 9/11 responses by the United States created a paradox for those defining human security as freedom from fear. While the generic causes of terrorism defined in terms of poverty, inequality, and injustice remained tangential, more and more investment in human and material resources is being made to reinforce the traditional arsenal of the national security state to counter terrorism. It is true that terrorism violates the human security of the noncombatant and thus necessitates counter-terrorism measures to protect individuals as well as states. However, it also creates grounds for human rights abuse. The contention on “homeland security” is a case in point. What is worse is that the vision of the world’s largest national security state has served as a role model of several Third World states.

Indeed the human security offers a transformative framework for protecting and empowering people – a long cherished vision of humanity, yet many in the typical Third World parlance find it an enterprises promoting western values to legitimize intervention against the poor and weak states. Ironically, the critique has come from two opposite camps. While the ‘Statists’ opposes it for demolishing the norms of non-intervention and sovereignty, the civil society finds in it a plot to re-colonize the Third World. The problems are confounded by the inner contradictions in Third World states. Unlike the more stable and cohesive nation-states of developed west, the post-colonial states of the Third World are still struggling with deep-seated divisions, which along with acute scarcity of resources constantly hamper the process of nation building. Often the ruling elite either overlooks the human security issues or become a perpetrator of human atrocities directed against individuals and communal groups. While there is no doubt about the responsibilities of the international community in such situations, where governments are unwilling or incapable or they perpetuate human insecurities, the truth is that states do not intervene for primarily humanitarian reasons and tend to use them selectively when it suits their geo-strategic interest.

Much like the contention in human rights, a divide also haunts the discourse on human security between ‘universalists’ and ‘cultural relativists.’ It is contended that the western notions of human security focus more on western liberal values such as political rights and ignore a communitarian ethos prevalent in many Asian societies. Accordingly, the Asian statesmen would not like to compromise development objectives to promote political and civil rights. These rights could be accorded priority only after the society has reached a certain level of development. The criticism also relates to the historic urge in the postcolonial Third World to shake off the intellectual dependency and evolve an indigenous concept of security. The predicament is that in the name of developing indigenous discourse, the elites in many post colonial societies tend to revive obscurantist traditions or fall into the trap of defending “our

national security” and “our nation-state” – once again a legacy of the colonial powers.

There are also suspicions in the Third World that human security has a ‘donor driven agenda,’ which intends to legitimize the forces of globalization. It is also pointed out that while the international agencies such as the UNDP prescribe the values and goals for the developing countries; the Bretton Woods institutions belonging to the same developed west advocate an unbridled sweep of globalization and economic liberalization which tend to undermine precisely that. There is no dearth of studies which evidenced the negative role of globalization on land security, food security, water security and ultimately, human security of poor people in the Third World. The lack of consensus on this issue may in the long run disorient the role of U.N. agencies in promoting human security.

Human security protagonists are concerned as much with the growing scale of poverty as with the gnawing global disparities. It is now a truism that poverty anywhere is poverty everywhere. The continued lopsided development in the world illustrates the fact that industrial countries, with 26 percent of the population, account for 78 percent of world production of goods and services, 81 percent of energy consumption, 70 percent of chemical fertilizers, and 87 percent of world armaments. Clearly, the unchecked growth of militarism in the world is the single most constraining factor in helping out people in the situation of human insecurity. This has led to a rising discontent in impoverished and deprived Third World youth against the rich, powerful, and imposing west making them easy prey to the siren song of extremism.

Indian Discourses:

Several Indian scholars have sought transnational partnership to explore the international ramifications of such threats arising from climate change, environmental degradation and resource depletion, spread of diseases and crimes natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, piracy and smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crimes. Funding agencies, like the Ford Foundation, have encouraged research centres in South and Southeast Asia, under the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia), to hold research workshops, that have produced a number of edited volumes on the problematic of NTS and how to deal with it. A noteworthy instance of such writings is the volume edited by Anthony, Emmers and Acharya (2006), which has employed the Copenhagen Schools’ securitization framework to examine the varied issues of non-traditional security in Asia. The volume consisting of eleven chapters includes many case studies relating to NTS issues such as disease, illegal migration, health, small arms, poverty and piracy. It focuses on the motivations and catalysts, which might encourage the political constellations to project the NTS problematic in national security terms. Abdur Rob Khan (2001) for instance has explored how rampant

globalization has impacted nontraditional security challenges in south Asia.

Similarly, the discourse on human security, which runs parallel to NTS, finds increasing expression in many Indian writings during this period. Kanti Bajpai (2000) has done a study examining the concept of human security and how to measure it. Yet another foundational contribution came through the writings of Navnita Chadha Behera (2001) who has analyzed the diverse intellectual streams constituting security discourses in South Asia and locating the lineage of human security within it. There is a continuing stream of work in the area of human security including a significant study by Monirul Islam (2010) that showcases it in Indian context. The list also includes Mallika Joseph (2007), Happymon Jacob (2005) who have focused on diverse aspects of human security and P.R. Chari and Sonia Gupta (2003) who have made a case of rooting the concept of security in the realm of social, economic, ecological and political choices. The contributors of this volume have discussed threats to human security arising out of a lack of governance, competition for energy resources, migration and the negative effects of globalization and gender discrimination. Ajay Darshan Behera (2008) disentangles the concept of “human security” and finds it integral to the core values of state security. In doing so, the author amplifies the complex ways through which violence and terrorism affect people’s security in South Asia. Tadjbakhsh Shahrbanou, Anuradha M. Chenoy (2006) argue that being premised on freedom from want and freedom from fear, the human security discourse is built to interrogate the state-centric models of national security and reject development models that do not reckon with social justice and equity and make development a predator of peoples’ security. The edited work of Thanh Dam Truong, Sasika Wieringa and Amrita Chhachhi (2006) engages with the current debate on human security in the context of globalization, offering a variety of feminist perspectives on some core issues regarding the gender reconfiguration of the state, power/knowledge systems and the implications for daily security. In a comprehensive volume Narottam Gaan (2009) has examined a issues and themes relating to human security, ranging from the concept of securitization as proposed by the Copenhagen School, poststructuralist visions of security, environmental security and feminist perspectives on Security.

Many Indian writings of this era have emphasized the pitfalls of applying western values of human security and humanitarian intervention in the southern hemisphere. Highlighting the west-centric orientation of the human security discourse, Amitav Acharya (2001) suggests a culturally sensitive set of Asian values to guide the discourse. Priyankar Upadhyaya (2004) has analyzed the third world anxieties over the way human security doctrine might provide grounds for politically motivated humanitarian intervention. There is indeed a growing recognition that the indigenous approaches of peacemaking have far greater chances of success as compared to

the template style international peace interventions effectuated through liberal or democratic peace. This viewpoint has been stressed, among others, by Sumit Ganguly (1996) who, drawing on his researches on Asian security has contended that liberal peace may not be relevant, or at least must be heavily qualified, outside of 'the West'. Sumona Dasgupta and Meenakshi Gopinath (2001) in a similar vein, focus on the feasibility and risks of external intervention and argue that innovative and sustainable techniques for conflict resolution must be explored before seeking military intervention within the framework of conventional *realpolitik*. This in turn shifts the emphasis from state-centric conflict resolution to the non-state actors.

Foremost of these is the role of civil society in peacebuilding process. Ashutosh Varshney (2002) in his pioneering study on India has demonstrated that the existence of social networks of civic engagement across communal lines is the key to prevent violence. In his subsequent writing, Varshney (2003) further explores the possible links between civil society and ethnic conflict on a global template. This surmounts the instrumentalist emphasis on political agency, ideology and pressures for explaining the acts of ethnic violence as explicated by Paul Brass (2003) in his earlier work. Priyanka Upadhyaya (2010) has traced the imperceptible ways in which the cultural dimensions and multi-religious synergy may contribute to the peace building process in urban centres where the episodes of communal /ethnic violence occur with greater frequency. Within civil society, the NGO's have received special attention; their role in peace building and post conflict reconstruction has been portrayed rather positively by Raghavan (2008). Yet another innovative area around which we find emerging peace perspectives is the contribution of Diaspora in peace building in their homeland, a phenomena that is well explored by Ashok Swain (1997).

The literature on the role of non-state actors: civil society/NGO's is quite influenced by the currently popular understanding of civil society as a secular and inclusive space that transcends ethnic and class barriers. Such modernist understanding is patronized by the global multilateral agencies and tends to ignore the societal, ethnic and class affiliations of civil society. A group of scholars from the (CRG) have revealed the stilted role of the so-called civil society as it fails to reckon with the wishes, aspirations and interests of the community in their 'unofficial' peace process (Das 2007; Banerjee 2007).

It is clear that despite the increasing salience of human security as a reformist discourse, not much has changed in the domain of *realpolitik*. Notwithstanding the occasional winds of change, not much tangible has been done to promote global consensus based on shared responsibilities and humanitarian concerns. Humanity is still living in the shadow of national security states, which, on the pretext of making

the world a safer place are erecting more ramparts dividing nations and peoples. For sure the responsibility of protecting human security eventually rests on the concerted efforts to promote sustainable human development at local as well as global level. Some of the crucial areas which warrant expanded global efforts for achieving human security goals are: increasing support for women's education, health, and family planning; programs to slow population growth; sustained efforts to manage and use forests, water, and soils—the resources that support most rural economies; regional and global recognition of the right of each person to a nationality; and measures to ensure effective citizenship.

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A Socio-Political Analysis of Nepal's Constitution-Making Process

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Background

Nepal, which has been struggling to set up a democratic system since 1940s, is yet to come up with a stable democratic set up. As the political situation in Nepal has been in turmoil for a long time, some scholars used to say that Nepal is in a “state of permanent transition”. Even sixty years after the end of the Rana hereditary ‘prime ministerial system’ in 1951, the political situation has neither been stable nor has improved. In fact, the struggle for democracy in Nepal gathered momentum after 1940s, especially after four Nepali youths were sentenced to death by hanging, by the government in 1942, as they were involved in protesting against the Ranas. It can be said that the movement in Nepal was inspired by the anti-British movement in India. The Nepalese, especially those who were in India as students, led the anti-Rana movement. Formation of Nepali Congress (NC) and adoption of a strategy of armed revolution to overthrow the Rana regime at its Bairgania (India) Conference of September 26-27, 1950 were two bold decisions which helped and inspired the Nepalese to strengthen the movement. Later, the revolution was supported not only by the then King Tribhuvan, but also by Indian and Burmese socialists, as the former put the throne to risk and went into exile in India; the latter actually fought as comrades-in-arms physically .

The anti-Rana revolution ended successfully on February 18, 1951. It was followed by a tripartite agreement that led Nepal to the path of democratization. But after two years of the successful movement, the then king Tribhuvan amended the interim constitution and started involving himself in day-to-day politics by violating the mandate of the movement, agreements and constitutional provisions. It prolonged the transition for almost a decade. Later in 1959, his son King Mahendra agreed to hold general elections for parliament only after strong pressure exerted by the political parties. The election had paved the way for formation of the first elected government in the country. However, the king dismissed the old one-and-a-half year’s government on December 15, 1960, and imposed party-less political system — *Panchayat* - claiming that he (the king) is the source of the constitution, and sovereignty vested

in him. Nepali people once again threw out the authoritarian Panchayat regime through their continued struggle followed by successful *Janaandolan* in 1990, and restored the democratic set-up. However, this struggle could not be sustained for long as it was challenged by both extremists viz., the extreme left (the Maoist), and the extreme right (the royalists). Again, in 2006 people came out on the streets to protest against the violent and authoritarian activities of both the extremists, and succeeded in a democracy struggle by overcoming all the threats posed by the institution of monarchy, the political parties, the Maoist, and the international community. In spite of the fact that Nepal witnessed a historical political transformation after 2006, it is yet to overcome the political crisis. In fact, there are still challenges ahead before ending the ongoing political transition by drafting a new constitution. Nepal failed to institutionalize the achievements of the various successful and historical movements. Weak, vision-less and inefficient delivery systems of the governments formed after the revolutions, “unnecessary” dependence on external powers, and lack of clarity of political parties about how to deal with the issues of minorities and deprivations, are the major factors that directly and indirectly have weakened political parties .

In fact, *Janaandolan-II* in 2006 was a path breaking example for democracy struggles in the world. For, in spite of shoot-on-sight curfew imposed by the government, more than one-sixth of the total population of Nepal came in the street to support democracy struggle. And the participants were not only the lawyers, journalists, doctors, poets, writers, teachers and other politically conscious section of people but also the generally apolitical people from every walk of life such as the laborers, farmers, rickshaw pullers, footpath traders, small hoteliers and others. participated the movement. Even taxi drivers and transport workers, normally the first to complain about a shutdown which affects their earnings, were supportive. The movement gained further momentum when government employees, and local administration officers, families of security forces and some palace-appointed administrators also supported the *Janaandolan*. The numbers of participants increased when the Maoist facilitated people from the villages to join the movement. It may be recalled that prior to the 12-point understanding, the Maoist used to bar people from taking part in activities announced by other political parties, especially the Seven Party Alliance (SPA).

Why did so many ordinary people join the movement? The answer was simple: they hoped the movement would end the conflict which had adversely impacted their day to day life for a decade. In rural areas, people were victimized by both the security forces and the Maoists during the “people’s war” People were forced to provide food and

shelter to both sides, but were then victimized by each side for helping their enemies. The security forces killed, raped, arrested, and tortured the villagers blaming them of feeding and sheltering the Maoists, and the Maoists killed, extorted, kidnapped and compelled the people to leave their homes for the same charge. Villagers lost confidence to speak with strangers about polity and society due to the fear created by both sides. On the other hand, people residing in the urban areas had relatively low impact from the Maoist conflict but especially transport workers, hoteliers and petty businessmen in the highway a faced hindrances due to the frequent and indefinite blockades, bandhs, extortion, coercion etc. during the conflict.

No doubt, Nepal has achieved a lot after the successful *Janaandolan-II* in 2006. The election of the Constituent Assembly (CA) held in 2008 in made a significant gain in making democracy inclusive. The CA which has been also functioning as parliament is the most inclusive elected body in South Asia with the representation of almost 33% women, 34% Janajatis, 35% Madhesis and 9% Dalits². Also, peaceful end of the institution of monarchy and entry of the rebel Maoists into the mainstream politics peacefully should be seen as a positive indicator of the democratic innovations in Nepal. However, in the post -CA period, Nepali democracy faces several challenges from various fronts. Though process of constitution making through the CA is a great opportunity for Nepal to consolidate democracy, it seems that every major party wanted to derail the process. On the one hand, the CA could not meet its deadline for promulgating the constitution even after an extension of its tenure for a year in May 28, 2010, there are also dozens of unresolved issues concerning the constitution on the other.

An atmosphere of uncertainties prevail across the country despite the extension of CA tenure for another three months following a 5-point deal signed by heads of three major political parties (UCPN-Maoist, Nepali Congress and CPN-UML) in the country on May 28, 2011. The agreement states that the basic tasks related to the peace process will be concluded within three months. The first draft of the constitution will be submitted to the CA within three months; various agreements reached previously with the Madhesi Front, including the one to make the Nepal Army (NA) inclusive will be effectively implemented, and the prime minister will resign to pave the way for the formation of national unity government based on consensus.

This is the second extension of the CA after its term (defined in the constitution) was over last year on May 28, 2011. Last year, it was the Maoist Party which did hard bargaining with the then government and its coalition partners. This time, the

NC along with the major Madhes based parties put forward conditions for the extension of the CA. Finally, the three major political parties signed a 3-point pact and extended the term of CA for a period of one year. But not a single point of the agreement was implemented by political parties after the extension of the CA last year. It was primarily due to the vagueness of the agreement. Interestingly, a similar ambiguity has existed in 5-point deal signed on May 28, 2011. As the clauses of the deal are ambiguous and lack clarity and detail, the concerned parties have started interpreting the clauses of the agreement in their own ways. For instance, Clause 1 of the agreement states, “basic tasks related to the peace process will be concluded.” There is no precision about what “basic tasks” means. According to the Maoist, Clause 1 is related only to the issues of management of its combatants, removing the dual security provision of its leadership, and in reaching an agreement on the modality of integration. Clause 1, as per the Maoist, deals with the number of combatants to be integrated, the ranks of the combatants after integration, the rehabilitation package, and the regrouping of combatants. But, the NC and other non-Maoist parties link this clause with other issues such as surrendering of arms to the state, returning the seized property to the owners, dismantling the Maoist’s paramilitary force-the Youth Communist League. Also, there is party-wise and individual-wise interpretation about when the Prime Minister must resign, and who would lead the country after his resignation.

The presentation of the first draft of the constitution within three months, seems impossible unless the parties intensify parleys to resolve the 99 unsettled crucial issues. 78 of the total 99 these issues are related to state structuring. The three major parties have agreed to form State Restructuring Commission (SRC) to recommend the model of federation. However, the decision has not materialized as yet. There is speculation that the Maoist, the NC and the-UML may agree to promulgate a new constitution without declaring the form of the federal set-up. Rather, they would agree to have a federation only after the recommendation of the SRC. On the contrary, Madhesi parties and ethnic organizations, doubting the intention of the three major parties, have said that they will not allow promulgation of the new constitution without a clear-cut provision on federation.

Further, the issue of mass integration or at least ten thousands Madhesi youth into the Nepal Army seems to have complicated Nepal’s political transition. Though no figures are mentioned in the recent agreement, Madhesi parties are demanding that 10,000 Madhesi youth to be given a chance to join the Nepal Army. This agenda will be initially backed by those who oppose Maoist combatants’ integration, thus

complicating the integration issue. Eventually, all hill people including the Maoist, are likely to oppose the proposal to integrate Madhesis in the army, in spite of the fact that the move will help the army become an inclusive institution. Consequently, Madhesi parties are likely to launch protests demanding the implementation of that demand

As all other non-Maoist parties seem to be reluctant about further extension of the term of the CA and as common people also seem to be tired of its repeated extensions, unless there is substantial progress in the peace process, the CA may become defunct by August 28, 2011. Once the tenure of the CA will be over without any progress in the integration process of Maoist combatants, they are likely to take a decision to prepare for a “people’s revolt” once again³.

Constitution-making Process

In spite of the fact that the CA which has been simultaneously working as parliament in Nepal was able to endorse and institutionalize the decision of the Interim Parliament to replace 210-year old Hindu Monarchical Nepal to a secular and federal republic. Except the election of Nepal's first President and Vice-President, the CA had not done much work on statute drafting within its tenure.- However, the CA members across the country were mobilized from February 27, 2009 by dividing them into 40 separate teams to collect public opinion. Around 3.5 million copies of 300 semi-structured — close-ended and open-ended – questions were circulated. The CA secretariat tabulated the public opinion and incorporated them into the preliminary concept papers to be drafted by the Constitutional Committee (CC) and other 10 thematic committees⁴. Most of the CA's thematic committees submitted their drafts to the CA. However, differences of opinion were found in 210 issues while collecting from various thematic committees in order to make a list. Along with them, there were 78 unresolved issues related only to State Restructuring Committee.

Regarding the progress about statute writing, only seven meetings of the CA were held during the time of the extension period from May 29 2010 to May 28, 2011. The CA has formed a high level task force of political parties under the leadership of the Maoist supremo in order to achieve a consensus on these 210 contentious issues. The task force was able to narrow down from 210 to 73. There was consensus on 127 issues by the end of December 20, 2010. In the meantime the task force became defunct after the Maoist decided not to extend that term. Interestingly, the decision was come just before the Palungtar Plenum of the party through which the Maoist party had adopted a political line to prepare for ‘people’s revolt’. However, the Maoist

party agreed to form and lead the Difference Resolution Sub-Committee (DRSC), under the CC in order to deal with disputed issues related to constitution writing on February 24, 2011. The Maoist party again decided not to extend the term of sub-committee, once its term was over in March 14, 2011, though the sub-committee had already settled other 40 issues within a short period and brought down the number of dispute to 35. Again, the Maoist supremo Pushpa Kamal Dahal expressed his willingness to resign from the post of the convener of the sub-committee. It is said that Dahal's decision to quit was due to the continued pressure from Maoist hardliners, who held the view that the party "had to compromise a lot and go back on its position on various issues" for the sake of consensus. However, Dahal again agreed on April 7, 2011 to continue in lead sub-committee following the mounting pressure from other political parties and civil society. Till May 28, 2011, there were only 21 issues that (along with the separate 78 issues which are directly related to state restructuring) remained as disputed.

A perusal of the main reports of all the 10 thematic committees and various decisions taken by the DRSC through various meetings, show differences of opinions on the following issues.

- **Nepal as a Republic, Federal and Secular State:** Though all major parties are working together on these issues, and all these themes have been adopted as part of the Interim Constitution 2007, these issues are yet to be a unanimous national agenda due to the voices of dissent of some smaller parties in the CA viz., Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP-Nepal) has been proposing to revive the constitutional monarchy and declare Nepal once again as a Hindu State; and Rastriya Janamorcha Nepal (RJN) has been advocating that Nepal should not go for any kind of federal set-up. The RJN is of the opinion that federalism brings about division and disintegration in the country. The RPP Nepal had advocated for a national referendum to decide Hindu state, monarchy, and federalism before the constitution is finally drafted.
- **Nepal as a Multi-national State based on Pluralism:** The Maoist have proposed to remove the word "pluralism" from the preamble of the constitution. They argue that after having followed the competitive multi-party system, it is unscientific to adopt the provision of 'pluralism' in the constitution. Taking this stand of the Maoist, NC and UML have expressed their doubt over the intention of Maoist. They hold the view that Maoists have not yet accepted democracy from their heart. Pluralism and plural thoughts, for them, are the corner stone of democracy. That is why, they want to enlist basic or fundamental principles of democracy such as freedom of press, rule of law, human rights, adult franchise, periodic election, free and accountable judiciary, supremacy of constitution, social justice,

etc., in the constitution, and uphold or endorse them by making these principles unamendable. When the Maoist opposed the addition of all these points to the list of unamendable provisions of the constitution, other parties have accused the Maoist party of nurturing authoritarian thought and character by denying pluralism and the competitive multi-party system.

- **Right to Self-Determination:** The debate is about preferential rights on natural resources, and economic sector, and prior rights (*Agradhikar*) on politics should be given to oppressed community, Janajatis, indigenous people and Madhesis. Though the NC and the UML and other parties are in favor of the rights and identities of the oppressed community, Janajatis, indigenous people and Madhesis, are not inclined to consent to the right to self-determination. The Maoist holds that the oppressed community, Janajatis or indigenous people and Madhesis should be given the right to self-determination, autonomy and self-governance.
- **Inclusive Polity and Proportional Representation System:** The debate on this issue is whether or not there should be freedom to form political parties, or should there be some pre-conditions to form a political party. This issue emerged when political parties had differences over the conditions for opening up political parties. The Maoist has forwarded a new condition in this regard, according to which, "It will not be considered prohibitive to formulate a law on banning political parties that encourage formation of mechanism or structure working toward treason and betrayal of the nation, working as stooges of the foreign powers, plotting against the nation, and regressive work." The NC and UML have expressed doubt about this in the new constitution stating that this provision is a ploy of the Maoist to ban the political parties that hold different philosophies and ideas.
- **Land Reforms and Property Rights:** Three major political parties have reached an understanding to impose land ceiling. But a fundamental difference among them is whether land beyond the fixed ceiling which an individual can own, can be seized by compensation. Maoist party is against the compensation, whereas others want to seize the excess portion of land only after providing compensation. Also, the Madhes-based parties are not in favour of ceiling on land, but they want ceiling on property as per the market value.
- **On Judiciary:** Major differences regarding the following points have been observed: (I) separate constitutional court to interpret the constitution; (II) Such interpretation should be made by the Supreme Court, and (III) whether the judiciary should be a separate constitutional body or it should be under the parliament. The Maoist had proposed that the Chief Justice of the

- Supreme Court could also be appointed from outside. The NC and UML had objected to this provision. For them, the system of appointing judges from outside of the courts can lead to the politicization of the courts. They also did not agree to the appointment of judges. For the Maoist, a special judicial committee of federal legislature should appoint the judges. The NC, UML and other parties were in favor of appointing judges from the judicial council. Over the issue of whether the constitution is to be interpreted by the federal Supreme Court or the parliament, the Maoist stand was for the system of interpreting constitutional issues by the parliament. On the other hand, the UML, the NC and other parties argued that the right to interpret the constitution should be given to the Supreme Court on the principle of check and balance of power. Eventually, an agreement was made on the proposal of 'Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) that recommends a Constitutional Court for dealing with the issues of interpretation of the constitution, issues of national concern and importance, human rights and citizens' concerns, and issues related to policies of the country.
- **System/Form of Governance:** On the issue of form of government, the parties are debating whether to have 'Westminster' system, or go in for Presidential system, or to have a different one. The Maoist party proposed the Presidential system with the executive power. In fact, the Maoist advocated that the executive president be directly elected by the people. NC and UML are in favor of the Westminster model parliamentary system, though UML's formal proposal advocates for popularly elected Prime Minister. The NC and UML are of the view that if the president is directly elected from the people there is a probability for him "to be powerful and even authoritarian." They further state that in a country where there is diversity of culture, language and race, president with executive power directly elected by the people will not appropriately symbolize national unity. They argue that if the prime minister is elected from the parliament and executive power is vested in him, and if the president is elected from the parliament and is given constitutional status, the president can represent the diversity of the country, and the president can also be elected from the minority, marginalized, and other communities. In the question of stable governance, the NC and UML proposed that a no-confidence motion can be registered against the prime minister within one year of assumption of office, and in case of doing so, the opposition has to suggest the name of the future prime ministerial candidate. NC and UML believe that this provision will contribute to minimizing political instability and frequent over throwing the government. Terai Madhes Loktantrik Party (TMLP) wants that the president be elected from the Lower House of parliament as the head of the State and Head of the Government. For

the TMLP, if the head of the state and head of the government is the same person, it can contribute to ending political instability. Also, a proposal of Maoist party states there should be a provision to recall the popularly elected president, and the matter should be decided by two-thirds majority of a political party to which he belongs. Again, the Maoist party is for an all-party cabinet, based on their strength in the parliament. However, non-Maoist parties unanimously oppose these ideas on the grounds that these proposals are against the spirit of democracy. About the proposal of Madhes-based parties, the MJF is in harmony with the Maoist's proposal to have a popularly elected executive head, but the TMLP is for executive President elected by the parliament.

- **Electoral System:** Political parties are divided over the issues of electoral system also. The NC and UML favor mixed electoral system with compensation. The Maoists favor multi-member Direct Full Proportional Election system in which people have to vote for a party's symbol, and all the candidates of that single political party (under that symbol) would be declared elected once the party bagged majority of votes in a particular constituency. In between, the CA committee on determining the form of legislature bodies finalized its preliminary concept and report on July 29, 2009 through majority. According to the report, there will be 151-member Federal House of Representatives elected through mixed electoral systems (76 - will be elected under a first-past-the-post electoral system, and the rest 75 - through a proportional electoral system). It has been decided that there would be a 51-member National Parliament Assembly, out of which 38 members would represent states, and 13 would be nominated by the House of Representatives. The draft has recommended 35-member unicameral legislatures in the states which would also be elected through a mixed electoral system. Also the committee has recommended giving the right to vote to all Nepali citizens aged 18 years and above. The proposal was supported by the NC and UML. However, the Maoist party has written a note of dissent on various issues of the report. According to the Maoist party's stand, there should be a multi-member constituency system with a 245-member unicameral people's representative, similar to the system practiced in China. The party also proposed forming a standing committee with 21 members at the most, under the people's representatives with an authority to carry out legislative work when the people's representatives are not in session. Regarding the issue on universal franchise, the Maoist proposal is to allow the franchise for all above 16 years of age.
- **Federal Structure:** If we go through the debate about restructuring the state, it is clear that there is no single voice within and between various parties. The NC and UML leaders have put forward their idea of state restructuring individually. The NC has not officially submitted its outline for state restructuring in the CA.

Though UML has submitted its copy, it is hard to tell which one is officially approved by the party. However, a very important fact is that the NC and UML are against making caste and ethnicity the basis of state restructuring, and argue that promoting caste distinction gives rise to the communalism, and finally leads to communal violence.

According to the report submitted to the CC, the country shall be restructured into 14 Provinces based on 'identity' as the primary basis for determination of provinces, whereas 'capability' would be the secondary basis. The Committee has proposed 23 autonomous regions. According to the report, indigenous people and Madhesi people shall be entitled to right to self-determination with regard to politics, culture, religion, language, education, etc. The NC⁵ and the UML⁶ have been claiming that the division of provinces on the basis of caste and ethnicity might disintegrate the nation, while Madhes-based political parties have been demanding the 'entire Madhes (Terai) as a single province'.

Though the Maoist has been backing the proposed 14 provinces passed by majority votes in the Committee. The UML lawmakers defied the party decision and supported it. The UML lawmakers' decision to support Maoist's proposal was possible as most of the lawmakers in the committee were from ethnic group background and Madhesi community. In fact, the preliminary report with 78 contentious points is yet to be settled.

Earlier, the political parties decided to withhold the report of the State Restructuring Committee as they agreed to form a high-level State Restructuring Commission to suggest the model of federalism and number of provinces prior to finalizing the committee's report. But an all-party meeting decided to forward the report to the CC, after they agreed to send it to the drafting committee at the all-party meeting, on the condition that the government would form the commission soon. This was not sent to the CC because the leaders of the major parties have agreed to form a SRC, which is expected to be formed (as per Article 138 (2) of the Interim Constitution) as soon as the new government is in place⁷.

The Maoist and Madhes-based parties, however, are against forming the commission. They have argued that further delaying the issue of state restructuring, under the pretext of forming the body, was not wise.

Though there are twenty-nine parties in the CA, most of the contentions in the committee discussions were specific to UML, NC and Maoist. As these three parties

did not move from their respective stands, committee discussions ended inconclusively. Other parties also expressed their diverse opinions in the course of discussions, but they waited for the big parties to come to the meeting and take their consensus for the solution to many key contentious issues. They seemed to have succumbed themselves to the notion that the big parties' decisions would finally overpower and dominate the political setting. The following section deals about the reasons that have helped delaying the constitution-making process.

1. Dilemma of the Maoist Party and Increased Suspicion among Other Political Parties

If we analyze the present situation, the Maoist party, being the single largest party in the CA, is more at fault as it is its reluctant to adopt pluralism with multi-party competitive politics. Unwillingness of the Maoist party to dismantle its cantonment and paramilitary forces - the YCL - also creates confusion and suspicion. It is busy in forming a new "volunteer force" instead of implementing its promise to dismantle the existing YCL. More than that, their statements and decisions to retrieve the violent politics have given ground to others to suspect the Maoists' and unwillingness to join the peaceful democratic politics through democratic constitution. On reading a statement of the Maoist leadership, i.e., "Anarchy and instability help Maoist to consolidate power for the further revolution — people's republic," one always has a doubt about Maoist commitment towards peaceful and plural politics. Also, the decision at a party plenum of the Maoist Party held in last November in Gorkha, a revolt and state capture could alone remove people's doubts over the Maoist strategy.

It seems that the recent 7-point agreement signed by the chairpersons of two communist parties — the Maoist and the UML — helped in polarizing the political parties sharply into two blocs — the leftist and non-leftist or democrat. The NC seems to be more conscious of its leftist counterparts after the agreement came into existence. I personally think that there is a genuine concern of the NC party, and past experiences give a lot of indication for the NC to be fearful of others. This is because the NC leadership has given a kind of moderation to the Maoist party in the beginning even if others, including the UML party and international communities, criticized the NC's approach as "unnecessary".

The government led by NC President late G.P. Koirala managed to hold the election of the CA even though the situation was not favourable due to the intimidation and violent activities of the Maoists. It has been acknowledged that the Maoist party could secure 27 per cent vote and emerge as the single largest party, only due to

the patience and tolerance shown by the NC party and G.P. Koirala. In fact, the NC was arguing that bringing a Maoist party into mainstream parliamentary politics was more important for the NC as well as the Nepali democracy and was prepared to bear with the adverse electoral prospects within one or two elections. But the Maoist party always considers NC's "wise" decision as its weakness. It is the Maoist party which goes all-out against the interests of the NC when the time comes to reciprocate NC's support. Either it is the advocacy of the left alliance, or the advocacy for the alliance of real nationalists including the ex-monarchists; attempts of the Maoist do not help to implement the agreement entered into with the NC. The Maoist party, on the one hand, appreciated the role of late G.P. Koirala for bringing the then rebellious Maoist into the mainstream politics. At the same time they also decided not to support his efforts to become the first president of the country. Once the Maoist party emerged as the single largest party in the CA and formed a coalition government under the leadership of its Chairperson Dahal, it pushed the NC into the opposition by denying the NC's demand to have Defense portfolio in the cabinet. Instead of negotiating with the NC on its concerns, the Maoist leadership went on saying that "beggar cannot choose." Then onwards, the trust deficit between the two largest parties began.

If we observe the priority of Nepali political parties today, it seems that the non-Maoist parties, especially the NC, have given priority to bring the peace process to the logical end before promulgating the new constitution. In other words, the NC shows its unwillingness to let the constitution be promulgated unless the Maoist take some steps forward on the on-going peace process by implementing the past agreements such as dismantling of paramilitary forces, dismantling of the cantonment by rehabilitating and integrating the Maoist combatants, return of the confiscated properties by the Maoist, etc. All non-Maoist forces by-and-large have an agreement on it. According to them, there should be substantial time gap between the end of the peace process and to promulgate the constitution. Then only the country will save the constitution-writing process from the shadow of Maoists' 'arms and armies', and people's desire to have a democratic constitution will be met. That is why it was mentioned in the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) that the task related to integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist combatants should be complete within six months of the election of the CA, and constitution should be promulgated in two years.

On the contrary, the Maoist party does not seem to be interested in concluding the on-going peace process before writing the new constitution. Rather, the Maoist

wants to keep the cantonment intact till the new election so that it can influence the election in the future too. Sometimes the Maoist party advocates for the 'leftist and nationalist alliance' just to avoid the concerns put forward by the NC. Once there is a call from the Maoist party on 'leftist alliance' a faction of the UML party becomes instrumental in helping the Maoist in this regard. However, it eventually helps to absolve Maoist from all past agreements. Though it was the NC which helped to form the UML leader Madhav Nepal-led government just after Maoist-led government resigned, the recent alliance between two leftists became possible because the UML was not happy with the NC leader, late Koirala, when he offered equal seats to the UML and the Maoist in the interim parliament. The move has been considered by UML leaders as an attempt of the NC to weaken the UML.

If we analyze Maoist party's decisions of the last couple of months, we get an impression that it wants to keep intact the cantonment till the new elections so that it helps them not only to influence the election outcome but also to provide large monetary benefit it is receiving from the cantonment as levy. In fact, it has changed its decision thrice either to focus on constitution writing and ending the peace process, or to prepare for "people's revolt" within a year. The Maoist leaders are playing such dual role even after they signed 5-point agreement. Leaders like Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, who has been popularized by media and foreigners as pro-democracy and pro-peace leader inside the Maoist party, also takes the position that integration of the Maoist combatants as well as the writing of the constitution "should take place simultaneously"⁸. Such repeated ideological dilemmas and confusion of the Maoist whether to lead or to withdraw from the sub-committee (formed to settle disputed issues related to constitution-writing) led us to conclude that they have other priorities over the constitution-making process.

Another very important issue is that the Maoist party always shows its vertical division once it has to implement provisions of the agreement signed with other counterparts. According to Lok Raj Baral⁹, individualistic thinking and lack of political culture are the leading causes of such a rift inside the Maoist Party. He further argues that there should not be such a rift, and differences if the Maoist party goes through an objective analysis on the idea of extreme Maoism before taking any precipitous decision on their "revolt". Here, I think, it has to be analyzed – whether such internal rift of the Maoist party is genuine or artificial just to avoid implementing their earlier promises. Evidence shows that the entire leadership of the Maoist party (either so-called hardliner or soft) sits with a united version when there is dialogue/negotiation with other parties. Surprisingly, however, they show their vertical division after the

dialogue gets over, and time comes for implementing it. A political analyst considers the rift of the present Maoist party as an 'acting' or drama¹⁰. The same thing has been repeated during and after May 28, 2011 too; the entire leadership was together to put forward their agenda while their dialogue was on about how to go for another extension of the CA. Dahal himself not only shared dais with Baidya, but also went on talking in Baidya's line on May 27, 2011. He stated, "they are not surrendering weapons easily which was exchanged with human blood"¹¹. As there are many things to be done by the Maoist party based on the 5-point agreement, a "serious" rift has again been developed within the Maoist party. It is said that Dahal and Baidya are at loggerheads ever since the former took the line of peace and constitution on April 30, and decided to accept Nepal Army's proposal on army integration and ending the dual security system of Maoist leaders. The miffed Baidya faction has intensified its campaign countrywide. The Baidya faction has circulated a two-page document to leaders and cadres alleging that Dahal is deviating from the official revolutionary line, putting aside the issue of national independence, heading towards a democratic republic instead of "people's republic", disarming the combatants in the name of integration, accepting Indian investment in hydropower sector, abusing party funds and attempting to maintain relations with the Indian intelligence. The following are the main points of the document entitled "Problems of Deviations in Chairman Comrade", which has charged Dahal with financial irregularities and misuse of resources¹².

- On the issue of financial discipline, Dahal is seen tilted toward corruption.
- Dahal is seen having the tendency of doing anything— both moral and immoral— for the sake of power, money and prestige.
- Dahal has deliberately left the party without an accounting system and misused financial means and resources in an individualistic way.
- Dahal of "self-centric individualistic tendency", intolerance toward those holding dissent and using his power to silence their voices.
- The chairman has developed a "fascist tendency".
- Dahal of extending relations with the Indian intelligence agencies.
- On the peace process, the hard-line faction has launched criticism campaigns against Dahal for bringing the Maoist combatants under the control of the Special Committee and accused him of disarming the PLA and emptying the cantonments in the name of "regrouping" without forging a national security policy, controlling the open border and setting up a border security force.
- The circular states Dahal deviated from the party's ideological goals by not launching appropriate programs to counter the party's "principal enemy" — India — and accused Dahal of extending relations with the sympathizers of "Indian expansionism and its comprador class".

- The Baidya faction has also come down heavily on Dahal's moves on the constitution drafting front as well. "Despite being said that we would go for a federal system with autonomy to ethnicities, the documents states that Dahal has emphasized unitary and centralized system". According to the document, Dahal has agreed to go for bicameral legislature succumbing to the "bourgeois theory of separation of power, and to minimize the participation of people in the judiciary under the pretext of judicial independence, instead of empowering the "People's Assembly".
- The document also criticizes Dahal for agreeing to make appointments of judges by a commission, not by the federal assembly as demanded by the party. The document expresses dissatisfaction over the party's move to go for "federal democratic republic" instead of the party's line of "People's Federal Democratic Republic."

In a strategic move, the Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal is preparing to shift his focus for the time being to the constitution writing process to ensure that it moves ahead simultaneously¹³ with the peace process in the next three months. Party insiders said Dahal took the decision to persuade the disgruntled hardliner faction led by Vice-Chairman Mohan Baidya to accept the party leadership's decision to complete the 'fundamentals' of the peace process as per the five-point deal. Baidya has disowned the five-point deal that led to the extension of the CA tenure on May 28. He has objected to Dahal's decisions, including the one to send Maoist combatants deployed for security of Maoist leaders to cantonments and handing over their weapons to the Special Committee. In fact, the Baidya faction has lately launched vitriolic polemics against Dahal and has been registering a series of notes of dissent against the party's decision. The relations between the hard-line faction and the moderators have further strained after the party establishment decided to end security being provided by Maoist combatants to the senior party leaders. Over two dozen combatants deployed for the security of the leaders from the hard-line faction have not yet surrendered their weapons and returned to the cantonments, despite the party's official decision to this effect. For the Baidya faction, any move by the party to hand over weapons or combatants to the government would tantamount to a complete "surrender" and dishonour for the combatants. The faction argues that peace process issues can only make headway if they are taken up simultaneously with the statute writing process. The integration of former Maoist combatants, Baidya insists, can start only after contentious issues in the new constitution are resolved. It is likely that the Dahal faction will address the rift by adopting Baidya's idea of making parallel progress in the statute drafting and peace

processes which seem to be unacceptable to other non-Maoist forces including the NC. In fact, the NC has said the statute's first draft cannot be introduced without completing the peace process¹⁴.

2. Lack of Conceptual Clarity

The major problem that confronts the constitution-writing process is the lack of conceptual clarity of the CA. The CA could not decide the kind of model — communist, or social democracy, or liberal democratic constitution. The NC proposed to decide about the model of the constitution on priority before debating on other issues. But the Maoist party suggested not to postpone the decision on the constitutional provisions, saying that the basic model of the constitution would be decided once the draft constitution is in hand. Here, the non-Maoist parties were right, i.e., the constitution-making process would be easier if there was agreement and clarity on the type of constitution they are going to draft.

3. Political Parties' Concern about Uncertain Future

The transitional phase has been prolonged solely because of the fact that these parties are not sure about their future after the constitution comes into force. The Maoist party, which has emerged as the single largest party with 38 per cent seats in the CA, seems to be reluctant to introduce the new constitution since it has sensed that it cannot impose its views in the constitution. Also, the leadership is not sure whether the party would be able to continue its position once it becomes a 'civilian party' by detaching itself from arms and combatant. Such uncertainty of the Maoist leadership regarding the future seems to be genuine as it would have been impossible for the Maoist party to bag the large number of votes in the last election if it could not have created an atmosphere of intimidation and terror¹⁵ through arms and combatant. And the Maoist leadership is well-known for the impact the combatants, cantonment and Youth Communist League (YCL) had on the election results. On the contrary, the Maoist leadership seems to have suffered from fear for its combatants cantoned for more than five years. Dahal's statement, which was shared with his "hardliner comrades" just before the Palungtar Plenum and Bhattarai's plea to the party and government against the conspiracy to kill him, can be analyzed in this regard. According to a report¹⁶, Dahal once stated, "I will be finished first if there is no integration. Then you all will not remain safe. That is why we should conclude the matter related to army integration". Also, the Maoist party seems to be more conscious of the "culture of threat" once its Vice-Chairman Baburam Bhattarai had received death threat from its own members. In fact, Bhattarai then informed Home Minister Krishna Bahadur Mahara and party General Secretary Ram Bahadur

Thapa about the incident. He also informed Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal about the incident saying “people who can threaten me today can also threaten you tomorrow; people with criminal mentality in the party should be punished”¹⁷. In this very complex situation, Maoist party seems to be in a quandary about where to go and what line to follow. That is why, they often shift party positions regarding the peace and constitution-making process.

Other major parties have also suffered from such uncertain future. The NC, which was badly defeated in the last election, seems to be optimistic about the future. But its leadership is fully aware of the complicated situation; they know that the party has to come up with a visionary proposal in order to address the voices of new aspirant groups for which its leadership is yet to be ready. In this situation, the NC may not improve its last election results. Also, the NC is focusing on ending the peace-process rather than on constitution-writing, as it is aware of the constitutional provision which states that each and every article of the constitution has to be finalised either through consensus or through two-thirds majority, though without the Maoist support this is not possible. For the UML, its leadership has suffered from a similar anxiety about the future as they are vertically divided on each and every major issue. The Madhes-based political parties seem to be going through a similar anxiety crisis as they could not be united but were to split in many groups for power. Such a split has been considered by Madhesi people themselves as betrayal of successful Madhes Andolan 2007. While analyzing all the dynamics, it seems that there is consensus between all the major parties of not completing the mission of writing the constitution on time so that they could remain intact in their present position.

Endnotes

- 1 Of Nepal's population, 37.8 per cent are Janajatis, but 33.39 per cent of CA members are Janajati. On the other hand, Madhesis make up 31.2 per cent of the population but have 34.9 per cent representation in the CA. Dalits make up 13 per cent of the population but have only 8.17 per cent representation. Similarly, 51 per cent of Nepalis are women, but they have only 33.22 per cent representation in the CA (for details, see <http://www.nepalitimes.com/issue/2009/03/13/ConstitutionSupplement/15753>).
- 2 See, Uddhab Pyakurel, Nepal After Three Months, IDSA Web Commentary, June 17, 2011, available at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/NepalAfterThreeMonths_upyakurel_170611.
- 3 The names of thematic committees are: (1) Committee for Restructuring the State and Sharing of State Power (2) Committee on Judiciary (3) Committee on Natural Resources, Economics Rights and Sharing of Revenues (4) Committee for Determining the Structure of Legislative Bodies (5) Committee for Determining the Structure of Governance of State (6) Fundamental rights and Directive Principle Committee (7) Committee for the protection of the Rights of Minority and Marginalized Community (8) Committee for Determining the Structure of Constitutional

- Bodies (9) Committee for Preserving National Interest (10) Committee for Determining the Basis of Cultural and Social Solidarity (11) Constitutional Committee
- 4 The NC has concluded that a maximum of seven federal states will be viable for Nepal. According to the NC decision, the federal structure will be divided as following: one province in the far-western region, two provinces in Madhes, one in Kathmandu Valley and its surrounding areas, one in eastern hill districts, and two states in the central region (http://www.reviewnepal.com/detail_news.php?id=2324).
 - 5 In fact, the UML has proposed 15 states—five in the Tarai (Bhojpur, Mithila, Birat and Lumbini) and 10 in the Hills and Mountains (Limbuwan, Kirat, Sunkoshi, Tamsaling, Newa, Magarat, Tamuwan, Gandaki, Karnali and Khaptad states) (for details, see <http://www.ekantipur.com/2009/11/17/0/State-Restructuring-UML-proposes-15-states/303035/>).
 - 6 For details, browse http://www.ccd.org.np/new/index.php?newsletter_detail_id=45, accessed by author on June 27, 2011
 - 7 See an interview of Dr. Bhattarai by Jyoti Malhotra, *Business Standard*, May 29, 2011.
 - 8 See Lok Raj Baral, *Maobadi Bhitra Nirarthak Jhagada* (Meaningless Fight inside the Maoist), *Kantipur*, June 20, 2011.
 - 9 For details, see Bijay Kumar, *Rajnaitik Siddhanta Ra Jibanka Pharak Pharak Ranga* (Political Ideology and Different Dimensions of Life), *Kantipur*, June 18, 2011
 - 10 See *Kantipur*, May 13, 2011
 - 11 For details, see <http://www.mastinepal.com/showthread.php?t=52477>; <http://www.ekantipur.com/np/2068/2/29/full-story/330778.html>.
 - 12 For details, see <http://www.ekantipur.com/2011/06/04/top-story/peace-statute-will-go-side-by-side-dahal/335115.html>.
 - 13 <http://www.ekantipur.com/2011/06/13/top-story/statute-draft-congress-for-revision-of-calendar/335618.html>
 - 14 For details about the situation in Nepal during the election, please see, Uddhab P. Pyakurel, Nepal Constituent Assembly Election 2008: An Observer's Account, *Mainstream*, Vol XLVI No 29. Available at <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article804.html>.
 - 15 See, Bhojaraj Bhat "*Chalbaji Ki Badhyata?* (Strategy or Compulsion?)" *Nepal Weekly*, May 13.
 - 16 For details, see <http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2011/may/may17/news02.php>.

Military in Nepal: Scope for Reform and Democratization

Indra Adhikari

“...Most ominous blunder committed by us was the neglect of the army.... We never tried to democratize the army...nor had we thought about any alternative option. Due to this mistake all our efforts and successes have been rendered useless at the moment”¹

The Security Sector Reform (SSR) as a whole and “democratization of military” particularly is most dominant issue or debate in both, academic and political circle in Nepal, as state is in a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic polity. It is natural in the changing context of the country to talk about operational and structural change of an institution, which is based on hierarchy and chain of command and mostly operates confidentially. The essence of democratization of Nepal Army (NA) is the process of making it compatible with the core value of democratic governance and its objective is to make the military accountable to the civil government in accordance with the notion of civilian oversight on military. The process is totally contrary to the past experience of the NA.

Background to Military and Politics in Nepal

The history of Nepali military is not too long. Prithvi Narayan Shah (P.N. Shah), king of Gorkha principality² and founder of unification of Modern Nepal is the mentor to bring and materialize the concept of regular military in the wake of Gorkha conquest. He established permanent army with five companies in Gorkha in 1773 after he defeated Bengali army under Gurjin Khan, seized all weapons³ and started to train people as professional military for men, materials and methods of the defeated military⁴. Focusing on physical and mental fitness and skill of the army as well as guerrilla warfare policy and tactic, he made a policy to include able people from other castes in army “without discrimination” on the basis of age, skill, experience, and ability⁵. But in practice, the standing army of Gorkha had a narrow social and territorial base as the subject population or *Praja* were divided into two categories

for military recruitment. Khas, Thakuri, Magar and Gurung were eligible for army and other several communities including Rai, Limbu, Kushel, Darai, Kumhale, Danuwar and Chepang etc were ineligible. Again, the *Tarai* community in south and *Bhotiya* people from the Himalayan region in north were perceived ineligible because of absence of their warrior tradition⁶. Brahmans having tactful mind also were categories as ineligible to serve in army but eligible for consultation in making strategies in terms of warfare policy, statecraft and guerilla warfare. This mindset of the Shah ruler in categorizing the people for decision-making and military purposes is responsible for determining the present power structure of Nepali state which is not inclusive in nature.

The priority was given to the military might by the Shah ruler providing access to the administrative work, the land , and others facilities. It recognized not only the role of military as "heroism" but their economic status as well as social prestige was also highly counted in the society. Similarly, their status was politically high mainly because of lack of division in civil-military functionaries as more importance had been given to the military activities of a person than those of civil-administrative activities. Thus, military- cum civilian personnel were on the topmost in political and administrative hierarchy just under the king and prince who created the military as unchallengeable and independent power that could determine ruler of the country. Second, the tradition of military command and control under the direct leadership of the king, created a symbiotic relationship between the two: strong leadership in terms of exertion of power and authority and the military. Being a highly professional institution, the military wanted to be commanded by the strongest leadership without whom institutional discipline could not be maintained . In this situation, it can be observed that the main stay of power was the military, and the main objective of the military establishment of Nepal was to fulfill the interest of the strong ruler whose image was also identified with the country. The role of the military was vitalized keeping it in frontline of state power and polity of Gurkha, and the rest who also supported authority physically, mentally and financially were used as subject.

Above everything was the secured position of the ruler under whose direction and coordination military was to act. The use of the judicious power of *Pajani*¹⁰, —an instrument for measurement of the loyalty to the ruler made the ruler powerful. The system was used not only to control but to reward and punish all the civil-military functionaries evaluating whether or not they had fulfilled their duty sincerely and honestly in accordance with their job assigned by the king¹¹. Only factional situation within the royal palace could weaken and threaten the absolutism of the king, while

at a time the powerless persons with royal status (male members of royal family like king's brothers, cousins and uncles) were in search of their role¹² and the courtiers were divided accordingly in different factions and involved in internal conflicts and tensions. The military— only means to gain the real power—always used to help the strongest one. This tradition compelled the nobilities to be guided by the spirit of personal gain and family advancement and also to adjust their political tactics for the sake of their own survival. Whenever opportunity arose, the courtiers' families represented in high ranking civil cum military functionaries did not fail to enhance their position at the cost of the royal power around which power, prestige, prosperity or property represented. In the later days after P.N Shah, the king himself was weak who could be influenced by his favourites. As a result, even a contributor from royal member to the 'unification of Nepal' i.e Bahadur Shah, the younger son of P.N. Shah, Bhimsen Thapan, *Mukhtiar* (Prime minister) and Mathbersingh Thapa Commander-in Chief of military became powerful¹³. They could influence the *Pajani* and also become victims through *Pajani* under extremely humiliating conditions. The result in terms of military involvement and its interference in state politics thus became evident.

When kingship became the powerful phenomenon at the centre, the first target of any new regime of Nepal was to control the military. Then, the new regime used to recruit its supporters and favorites in officer level of military as if it was the place for political appointee, and remove the personnel recruited by the last regime. The trend was a common practice of each and every new regime. Such practices to eliminate the former factions brought a complete reversal of political alignments. As a result, any faction in power sought to perpetuate itself by continuous and systematic elimination of all real or potential threats to the regime. Thus, Court conspiracies and intrigues were the only means available to induce changes in the government that came about usually as the climax of a successful "treacherous scheme". The Nepalese political process was soaked in blood and violence in the direct involvement of military. None of the *Mukhtiyar* and regents between 1769- 1846 died a natural death; their lives were ended either by the bullet or sword, or by their own hand in highly humiliating conditions¹⁴.

Similarly, the ruler used to appoint his favourites and relatives in major civil-military posts to consolidate the power and secure his position. Recruiting brothers, nephews, other relatives in the higher posts of army, and removing the previous post- holders through *Pajani* was another tradition of the ruling elites. As there was no established rule and regulation of recruitment, promotion, retirement and mobilization, military

functionaries used their capacity to make the ruler happy. It was the fundamental requirement to renew one's job. In this situation, there was less effort in enhancing the military professionalism.

During the course of history of the Shah regime, not only the Shah Kings but also some civilians had performed a strongmen's role. Such practice was seen in the condition when the king was either minor or weak. But they could be sacked anytime by the king either by using his *pajani* or defeating them by developing and using the parallel military might. It had happened when the man started to work independently without taking sympathy of the king¹⁵.

Though the rulers have made favoritism in the military a tradition, it has created rampant corruption and use of military as an ultimate power in totalitarian manner. On the other hand, because of the use and involvement of military to fulfill the conspiracies, yearly appointment, renewal and removal system not only created instability of the ruling elite but politicized the role of the military making it exclusionary in nature. It was dominated by the so called "High Caste Hindu Male" from the "Hills".

The history of Nepal shows that the mainstay of power of the country is military. Even after the establishment of Rana oligarchy in the country in 1846, the military strength was recognized as the only location of power. As under the Shah, several coups and counter-coups staged one after another were continued as an alternative means to change the government during the Rana regime that was purely military despotism in nature and oligarchic in overall character¹⁶.

King -Military Relations (1951-2006): Impacts on Democratization

After Rana polity ended since 1950, the Home Minister of Interim government of 1951, B.P Koirala shifted military from Singha Darbar (office of Prime Minister) to Narayanhiti Darbar (Royal Palace), and the king-military relation was restored¹⁷. Presence of military might in Palace boosted the ambition of king Tribhuvan after he became Co-in-C, who suspended the entire provision of the Interim Constitution relating to the executive power of cabinet that "vested in Monarch through Especial Emergency Power Act, 1954. The provision made the King assertive consolidating power that not only diluted promised of the election of the Constituent Assembly, and compelled the people to accept the Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal, 1959 as a gift of monarchy. The Military Act 1959, which made the C-in-C of the army staff responsible and accountable to the King rather than the government through "Act

on Right, Duty, function and Terms of the Service of the Commander-in-Chief 2026 (1959), further consolidated military-monarchy relationship. As a result, the experiment of the newly achieved multiparty parliamentary democracy could not work for long and lasted only eighteen months since 1960. The trends of prioritizing the socio-economic sectors were started and automatically the military was marginalized until 1960' coup of king Mahendra who became the King after his father died since 1955. He expected to further strengthen the position of the army in the country' political setup in order to make the institution of monarchy more secure. So, he not only increased the strength of army by providing it with more facilities and equipping it with modern weapons but he changed its name also from Nepal Army to Royal Nepal Army as personal army of monarchy and increased defense expenditure that reached 30% (of GNP) in 1963, "more than international standard"¹⁸. Along with this, the king banned political parties, dissolved the parliament, arrested the Prime Minister with Defense portfolio and other political leaders by mobilizing the military. He promulgated another constitution in 1962 and introduced Partyless Panchayat System under the "active and dynamic leadership" of King that remained till 1990.

The Mass movement in 1990 launched against the Panchayat System established the multi party democracy in Nepal and the character of the monarchy was changed from "active" to constitutional. NC leader Krishna Prasad Bhattarai was appointed as the Prime Minister with the responsibility to make democratic constitution. But unfortunately, immediately after the formation of the new interim government, the police and army ignored the political change and got involved in several conspiracies with the royal members.¹⁹ It is said that there was police and military backing to the pro-palace groups who were trying to create disorder through planned attempt for counter-revolution by training "secret police" and "vigilantes". As a result, the prime minister had to appeal to people "for the full co-operation"²⁰ when he found difficulty to handle the situation using the law enforcement machinery. It was rightly proved by the expression of the Interim Prime Minister (IPM) Bhattarai that they (political parties) couldn't undermine the king who "ha[d] the 35,000- army and the police behind him"²¹. Bhattarai also sought the intervention of the king²² to help the government for "taking action against any activity that "hurt the morale and confidence of the police"²³. The appeal of the Prime Minister not only proved more crucial for the government to enforce law and maintain peace because the police, the bureaucracy and especially army, showed loyalty to king and but recognized him also as one of the main "power centre[s] of the country" even after the change.

The king's attempt to reform the previous constitution through the Constitution Reform Recommendation Commission proved that the king was not ready to internalize the change²⁴. Similarly, the use of the military to pressurize the Chairman of Constitution Recommendation Commission, Bishwanath Upadhyaya²⁵ (COCRC) and the Interim Prime Minister (IPM)²⁶ by exercising its strength in the interest of the king helped not only sensitize soldiers within the organization about the interests of military²⁷ under the broader concept of powerful kingship²⁸ but continued the traditional power of the king .

Such king-military tandem helped provide real sovereign authority to the "KING" who ultimately "promulgate[d]" *The Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal 2047(1990)* "by virtue of the state authority as exercised by [Him]" and his "forefathers". Moreover, the "sovereign" people were deprived of the power of changing four fundamentals of the constitution—multi-party system, constitutional monarchy, sovereignty of the people, and the basic rights of people. Generally, sovereignty provides an open space to the people to change/choose the polity of the state under which they wanted to be governed. If the sovereignty of the people was accepted in de-facto sense, Nepali people might not engage in different movement for establishing "full-fledge democracy" time and again since 1950 aiming at the holding election to a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution and establishing Nepal .

The constitution had also provided special facility to the king that granted free tax in income and personal property of royal family²⁹ and made the king above the legal remedy. Unless it was explicitly stated that a particular power was his own, the king was always supposed to act on the advice of his cabinet through prime minister³⁰. However, the court could not enquire into whether or not such advice had been given to him by the cabinet³¹. Declaration of the State of Emergency (SoE), house dissolution, military mobilization for three months "by proclamation" etc. were with the monarch³², though such SOE had to be approved by the parliament within three month for its continuation³³. The experience of 2001 had shown that even if parliament was not able to approve the SoE, it could be dissolved, but the SoE could be continued. Similarly some prevailing constitutional ambiguities³⁴ also provided space to the king to play in accordance with his interest. By using it the king had been deciding to accept or reject the different proposals of the three elected prime ministers³⁵ from both majority and minority governments for dissolution of House of Representatives (HOR) after 1990. Abusing the same constitutional confusion he sacked the elected government under the premiership of Sher Bahadur Deuba, and dissolved the House of the Representatives in 2002.

The location of military power traditionally and constitutionally remained with the king because he was the Supreme Commander of the Royal Nepal Army³⁶ with the power to appoint the Commander-in-Chief³⁷ on the recommendation of the Prime Minister who was also the chairperson of the National Defense Council (NDC). After king Tribhuvan declared himself as Supreme commander of military in 1953, proclaiming the “Sovereign Right” vested in him given by his forefathers, king has been controlling and commanding the military as the supreme C-in-c and field marshal. Then such decorative posts were made real for using the army in the interest of monarchy. Similar positions were provided in the 1990 constitution without underlining any limitation. On the other hand, no constitutional provision for “establishment and management of RNA and other matters relating to army was fixed but left out for determining all these actions by law in the future³⁸. But the parliament itself was not free to make the law related to RNA constitutionally as any Bill relating to the RNA (and Armed Police Force as well) were to be introduced as government Bill and any amendment to such Bill might “be introduced upon the prior approval of the king”³⁹. The King was not compelled constitutionally to approve such bill⁴⁰, though theoretically, the king had no other role except for making Palace rules for royal family members and Palace bureaucracy.

The constitution had accepted the concept of dual/common command of non-professional leadership of the RNA having viewed that the military could neither be politicized by the civil leaders nor could be misused by the king as both had entirely different role, goal, ideology and background—hereditary king as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of RNA and Defence Council under the elected PM having full authority to recommend the king to mobilize military but no right to raise any question⁴¹ whether or not the activities performed by the king was in the recommendation of the council. Thus, constitutionally and traditionally the king was in fact powerful. No government with the experience of majority, minority and coalition formed after 1990 tried to reform the military institution addressing the security situation in changing political context. Neither the Military act nor the security policy made during the Panchayat period were renewed, reviewed or changed in order to establish the civilian supremacy over the military. As a result, no government formed after 1996 could be able to mobilize the military to curb the Maoists, as extra constitutional opposition force⁴² till 2002. Even if it was moved from the barrack, it did not act in the fields in accordance with the spirit of the government reportedly in the signal of the palace, as then military officers claimed that they had neither support of the local people nor other political parties in the parliament. So it led not only to the resignation of Home Minister, Govinda Raj Joshi in 2000 accusing military

of not cooperating to the government in Dunai as agreed upon between them but also forced PM Koirala to resign apparently showing his disagreement with the King⁴³ on the issue of army mobilization and its action in Holeri after mobilization. Neither the King nor the military was happy with G.P. Koirala because he not only advocated powerful “Prime Ministerial System” but preferred to form/promote other security agencies also rather than Military⁴⁴. Thus, civilian leaders were responsible to a greater extent to create antagonism with the military because of their ignorance of the army, as they never tried to develop relation with the military in both individual and institutional level. This attitude of political leaders left no option to the military which itself was not feeling comfortable to be commanded and controlled by the “subject class” people who led the government. So they preferred to continue their relation with the king whose class culture and strong position favoured them. Divisions within and among the parliamentary political parties, and the request of opposition leaders of ruling party and opposition parties in parliament to the king time and again to take action against the incumbent elected PM helped the military to locate the real power and authority of the state, which on the other hand used to appear always in favour of the professional advancement/opportunities of the military. It seemed that the RNA obviously wanted to be controlled and commanded by the owner than by his servants who used to beg help with the king not only to form and remain in the government but to exert its power and authority, and to change and dissolve it also.

On the contrary, the largest political parties—NC— which led the government mostly after 1990 and CPN(UML)— had socialist agenda, but both failed to unite and to implement skillfully their agendas. This provided an opportunity to the feudal elements represented by the institution of Monarchy.. So, the major fact of the king-military tie was their similar class interest and ideological differentiation with major political parties, whose success and failure could matter for their individual, family, and institutional interest. RNA, played vital role to make civil leaders in government “incompetent” to fulfill their responsibilities⁴⁵. It also did great damage to the democratic party—NC—by, boosting the ambition of the king to make democracy unsuccessful⁴⁶. It eventually led him to form the government under his leadership and to suppress the People’s Movement II ruthlessly mobilizing all the security agencies under its command⁴⁷.

2006 Movement and Its Impact on Democratization of Army

The ruthless suppression of the protest led to the formation of the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and and also the conclusion of its 12-point agreement with the Maoists

in 2005. T Both the Maoists and the SPA decided to work together for ending the absolute rule of the King through the *Janaandolan II*⁴⁸(Mass Movement II). The movement compelled, the King to “give back the people’s power in April 2006 despite his all out efforts to quell the movement by force., While people supported overwhelmingly the agenda of the eight political parties, military that has been supporting the “de-facto authority”, expressed its commitment to respect the people’s mandate and respect the Historical Declaration of the restored House, which was converted into Interim Parliament. First step taken unanimously by the interim parliament was to detach the relationship of Institution of Military from the Monarchy testing and telling the military whether its loyalty to the Monarchy shifted to the parliament or not?. The so called “Royal Army” which could not save the whole family and relatives of King Birendra in 2001 ignored reportedly the order of the palace to take action against the decision, while the interim parliament decided to shift the power and authority exercised by the King to the Prime Minister a declaring Nepal as a Federal Democratic Republic by the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly⁴⁹. The Military also accepted the decision taken by the parliament related to the Royal Nepal Army without any hesitation, while the restored parliament declared Royal Nepal Army as Nepal Army, the prime minister as supreme Commander-in-Chief of the military, His Majesty’s Government of Nepal as Government of Nepal, and Hindu state to secular state⁵⁰. All the steps taken by the interim parliament were against the major demands of military in 1990.

In addition, the provisions of Interim Constitution are guided by the theory of civilian supremacy over the military that obviously compelled military to be controlled and commanded under the civilian leaders in government. According to the constitution, the right to appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Nepal Army⁵¹, to control, mobilize and manage it are vested mainly in the Council of Ministers on the basis of principle of check and balance, and separation of power⁵² among the council of minister, National Defense Council and the interim parliament. The provision of National Defense Council (NDC) includes only the cabinet members excluding the institutional representatives of the Military⁵³. Similarly, the New Army Act introduced new regulations for management and maintenance of the army. The provisions, language and certain terminologies used in the Act promote military ideally to work for full-fledged security, democracy and the respect for human rights— fundamental requirement for the sake of building a stable, strong, accountable and transparent institution based on the rule of law that can deliver real justice.

So the debates have already been started as per the Interim Constitution stated⁵⁴ for “democratization of NA: (1) by fixing “appropriately the numerical strength of the

Nepal Army⁵⁵ making relevance to the geopolitical and economic reality of the country; (2) by initiating the exercise for making NA's structure "democratic⁵⁶, representative and inclusive with reflection of "national character"⁵⁷ and (3) by developing the character of "the army in accordance with the norms and values of democracy and human rights"⁵⁸. For its implementation new security policy that is yet to be made should be prepared. But the Interim Government has already concluded agreements with the regional political parties and indigenous communities to adopt a policy of the recruitment in the NA from the marginalized section of society for reforming the NA. The issue of integration of PLA into security forces also has been taken especially by the Maoists as a process of "restructuring" the NA, though divergent views have come from other parties in this regard as well.

People's Liberation Army Vs Nepal Army: Controversy over Integration of PLA into Army

The CPN Maoist that has led the government after CA election is of the view that Nepal Army will be the "National Army" after integration of ex-PLA of the Maoists which as they claimed, was formed by, for and of the people during the People's War. Hardcore groups of the Maoists and leaders in government from PLA background claim that the rest of the PLA in cantonment after UN verification are qualified to be soldier, because they "do not believe in the required qualification of the soldiers based on the measurement of chest and height in inches", and "bourgeois education". The "capacity and motivation to sacrifice their life for the people"⁵⁹ in spirit should be the basis for integration. As they argue, the Nepal Army neither represents the structure of Nepali society, nor has such orientation and motivation.

The other parties not only in oppositions in the CA but in the coalition government do not agree and view that all the ex-PLAs kept in cantonments are not qualified for integration in the "National Army". Because they are not only politically trained and indoctrinated by the communist ideology by fighting under the CPN Maoists, but most of them are unable to meet the required minimum standard of National Army. Thus, integrating PLA into the Nepal Army would mean not only to politicize the National Army which should be non-political and non-partisan in spirit, but to make Nepal Army weak professionally.

The reality is that the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) had developed only two basic criteria to verify the ex-PLA kept in cantonment: (I) all the verified ex-PLA were involved in any form of armed activities sooner or later during the People's War, and (II) all of them are above the age of 18 years. In principle, UNMIN's role

is just to assist the management of arms and armed personnel by deploying “civilian personnel to monitor and verify the confinement of combatants and their weapons within designated cantonments”. So the UNMIN had neither the agreement enforcement right to the respective parties, nor had itself independently fixed the verification criteria that were concluded in the understanding of the both parties—the interim government including the Maoists and the Maoists party—in the assistance of UNMIN⁶⁰.

Surprisingly, no agreement has clearly spoken that ex-PLA would be integrated only in NA as claimed by the Maoists but in “security sectors” that are Nepal Police, Armed Police Force, National Investigation Department and NA in Nepal. All agreements also talk about the “rehabilitation of the Maoists Army combatants”. Similarly, a document on “Agreement on Monitoring of Management of Arms and Armies”⁶¹ accepted the combatants as a form of political “army” having lack of quality for professional army⁶². Contrary to it, NA has been involved as a counterpart of PLA in the process of verification and “Management of Arms and Armies”: weapons of NA also are stored in equal number of stored weapons of the ex-PLA; and no other security agencies except NA remained in its barracks as ex-PLA is confined in cantonments.

It seems that both parties hold extremely opposite views: either to integrate all PLAs into NA or only to rehabilitate them. Misunderstanding has been created because of unbalanced expressions of the Maoist leaders annoying the other parties in the government and opposition. The modus operandi of the Maoist Party-differentiation between action and expression is also eroding their credibility whether they are committed to the established system, its norms and values or not. Thus, the ex-PLA management issues become more complex, while an official resolution passed in National Meeting of the Maoist party came out with the instruction to “prepare the PLA politically and ideologically for the offensive [purpose] to complete the revolution”. They also would continuously hold “regular interactive meetings with the party committee in the army”, and use the issue of army integration “in a manner that will further the cause of proletarianism and revolution”, though the PLA is not formally under the United CPN Maoists, but Special Committee for Army Integration of the government. Antagonism also has been created among the major national political parties, while the Maoists define their position demarking the relationship with NC- main opposition party as major enemy and UML-major coalition partner of the Maoists led government as opportunistic force which should be treated accordingly. Crisis of credibility of the Maoist stand on democracy has made the

PLA management process linger in spite of formation of Technical Committee under the Special Commission for Army Integration.

The major problem, it seems, is lack of honesty but not army integration issue as the whole peace process has been halted in its name. Both views are extremist and against the spirit of the agreement, peace process, the Interim Constitution and result of CA election that dictated the major political forces to solve the entire transitional crisis through coordination, cooperation and consensus. Contrary to it, the parties are divided and competing for influencing the military for their respective petty and partisan interest in stead of making decision for long-term national interest. Because the present situation suggests that the Nepali people work rigorously for rethinking and renewing existing provision on integration of PLA in order to make the process practical and relevance in accordance with the spirit of the process. It should maintain peace for ever, as more than 42 armed groups are waging war in different part of the country and some of them have already demanded in the negotiation table with the government to integrate their combatants also into NA.. The political forces within the system should take bold decision whether it is better to follow the words and spirit of peace process that establishes the precedent of integration of all the interested armed groups into NA and or to search for other holistic option in which other combatants also could be included⁶⁸. Homework should be done whether a soldier is qualified by the skill to hold and use the weapons indiscriminately? Do education, physical fitness and mental or psychological health, age factors not matter for serving the National Army? Can an armed rebellion motivated by the revengeful attitude towards some political parties, section, class, caste and regional groups after his/her integration in National Army treat impartially to all the people of the country?, Can they maintain the dignity of Nepal Army which has been playing peace keeping role on behalf of the state by participating in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations? Can the country like Nepal resolve the problem and maintain its national army, if all the unemployed/unsatisfied people demand to recruit them in NA? Is the big army desirable and relevance for Nepal? More importantly, can Nepali people expect the non-political and non-partisan army that can respect the civilian supremacy over the military? And how can the government differentiate the role of military from militant and criminal groups?

Now 1460 ex-combatants including 71 officers are integrated in NA and the rest took voluntary retirement. Though it is perceived that the real combatants could not be integrated because of unhappiness with the party stand for deciding the terms and condition of integration. On the other hand the combatants who were disqualified

by the UN saying that either they were new recruits or minor are now organized and threats were organized and demanded for their job or other kind of compensation as given to those who took voluntary retirement. According to them, either to provide the same facility or they can revolt again. One of the radical groups of UCPN Maoist led by Baidhya provokes both the unsatisfied group to uniform again for fighting against feudalism represented by existing political parties including their mother party UCPN Maoist.

Even if there is consensus among major political parties, the government can settle the ex-PLA and other militant and military related issues anyhow. This is up to the capacity and will of the Maoist party to take other parties in government and opposition into its confidence, and to convince its ex-PLA living in cantonment to settle the problem amicably. In addition, about four thousand conflict victims who were compelled to leave their job from the security force are agitating for reappointing them in their respective jobs and posts. It has also raised a question whether the recruitment in security sector means just to get employment for one's own livelihood or is required a concept of capacity to sacrifice the "life", if necessary, for the people and the country. Such distinct nature of the job makes symbolic status of the security sectors as "highly emotionalized" and "distinct professional institution"⁶⁹.

Problems and Prospects

It is proved that there is symbiotic relationship between the democratization of military and political stability. Since military institution itself is never democratic by its character. Political leaders in government and opposition should at least be united in making/ implementing the security policy providing supreme authority to the government for commanding and controlling the army. Such processes would automatically help the democratization of military and establish civilian supremacy over military. Vision and capacity of the civil leaders to develop relationship with the army— individually and institutionally, and his/her attitudes and sensitivity towards corporate or professional interest of military determine the good civil-military relation. Because of lack of such vision, the first elected PM of Nepal, BP Koirala, regretted lifelong as the military helped the King to hatch the coup in 1960⁷⁰. Similarly, the military could not cooperate with the civil-government after 1996 that emboldened the King against democracy in 2002 and 2005. It is mainly because of division among the political leaders and parties within the system that not only made them lose the popular base but also allowed the Army to support the ambitious King who wanted to be heard and seen before the people.

Havoc had been created wrongly that the military would come into the fore, if the power and authority of the monarchy was curtailed. So one of the main requirements of political stability is unanimous agreement of the major parties at least in minimum level of value based politics, that helps make not only leader in government popular and respectable, but military subordinate to and supportive of the institution of the government also. Because, to democratize military in Nepali context means to make military under the civil government contrary to the history of military that made it as an independent factor to determine the de-facto power.

The civil-military relation has been threatened now by the division of political parties for the sake of their petty and partisan interest. After detaching the relationship of military from the monarch institutionally and politically, the democratic political parties especially NC {even CPN (UML)} thinks military as its nearest force, so it has been lending unconditional support to the military for its undue activities. CPN Maoists, now United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) wanted to weaken the army thinking it as a rival organization. Similarly, political parties from Tarai want group recruitment of Madheshi people in military through political decision on the basis of population. The military strongly opposed the government's order to stop the new recruitment as "regular process" But the government is equally responsible to make such precedent because of incompetence of Defence Minister to make independent and rational decision⁷¹. In addition, he internationalized the issue saying that the military is acting as foreign diplomats in Kathmandu signaled it. The statement annoyed not only the military but international communities also⁷². What is the reality is that all the political parties reacted to the NA recruitment process⁷³ being guided by the short term calculation for their political gain that made them divided and weak. As a result, the Chief of the Army Staff opposed, on the one hand, the request of the parliamentary committee for National Interest Preservation to clarify the cooling relation between the Ministry of Defence and NA saying that it was not concerned authority/place for that matter. He not only started to act and talk in political nature⁷⁴ but demanded to revive his role in the main decision making body of the government, especially in National Defence Council. The manner in which the RNA ignored the Prime Minister and Defence Minister on the Army day on the occasion of Shivaratri also suggested that there has been no cordial relationship between the Army and the Maoist government.

So it can be said that no single political party can control the situation now, as major national issues like restructuring the state, security sector reform, ex-PLA and other combatant's management has already been resolved. Though, there is less hope

for new constitution to be prepared within the deadline. Thus, there is no option for political parties which needed to work together to overcome the problems of critical interim period. Otherwise, the romanticization of the any day to day issue of political and military reforms alone can stop the whole process. If the established civilian rule is eroded due to the high degree of partisan and personal interest of politicians and failed to take the ongoing political process to a logical conclusion, politics is likely to be more uncertain. It will also undermine the very spirit of the 2006 movement.

Endnotes

- 1 B.P Koirala, Jail Journal, Lalitpur: Jagadamba Prakashan, 1997.
- 2 One of the principalities in Baisi and Chaubisie before the unification of Nepal in 1768
- 3 Baburam Acharya, Shree 5 Badamaharajdhiraaj Prithivi Narayan Shahko Samchhitpa Jeevani, Kathmandu: Shree 5 Maharajadhirajka Parmukh Sambad Sachibalaya/Rajdarbar,1970:622
- 4 Tulsi Ram Vaidya et. Al., Nepalko Sainik Itihans (Military History of Nepal), Kathmandu: Shahi Nepali Jangi Addha. 2049 VS./1993.
- 5 Prithvi Narayan Shah used to include defeated army of other principalities in his military organization "without discrimination" but he never gave a leading role to them. Armed forces of other principalities were from dominant caste and ethnic communities of the principalities such as Magar who were in dominant position in the principalities of Western Nepal and Rais who were in the Eastern Nepal. See, Narahari Nath Yogi and Baburam Acharya, Rastrapita Shree 5 Badamaharaj Prithivi Narayan Shahdevko Dibya Upadesh, Kathmandu: Prithivi Jayanti Samaroha Sameeti, 2010 BS/1953:7.
- 6 Nava Raj Panta, Sri 5 Prithvinarayanshahako Upadhesha, (Teachings of King Prithvi Narayan Shah.) in RNAHQ, nd: 85-88.
- 7 One of the pillars of Prithvi Narayan Shah — strength of army—was guaranteed by providing them land exempt from major taxes, so that they would be able to fight without anxiety for the welfare of their family See in, Nava Raj Panta, Sri 5 Prithvinarayanshahako Upadhesha, (Teachings of King Prithvi Narayan Shah.) in RNAHQ, nd:p17. According to Prithvi Narayan Shah "an important point is that the soldier [was] required for the king and should be given their house and land and that they should farm it, so that they can support themselves by both means" see, Ibid. The civil and military administration was not compartmentalized and the land—only source of revenue for the state—was distributed under different schemes to the civil and especially military personnel:
 - (1) Land was assigned to government employee as emoluments under the scheme of jagir for rendering civil and military functions of the state in lieu of cash payment or salary.
 - (2) Birta land had been ordered for the widows and the sons of the military personnel who fell in battle for their support until they were able to either assume the role of tenants in their won right or to serve in the army see in Baburam Acharya, Shree 5 Badamaharajdhiraaj Prithivi Narayan Shahko Samchhitpa Jeevani, Kathmandu: Shree 5 Maharajadhirajka Parmukh Sambad Sachibalaya/Rajdarb.1970, p17.
 - (3) Some territory was also assigned as Birta land to an increasing number of those showing exemplary valor in the battlefield.
 - (4) Birta land was also granted to the other influential local persons of other principalities who facilitated the conquest of the Gorkhali ruler or pacified the local people in accordance with the interest of Gorkhali territorial occupation.
 - (5) Land was assigned as Guthis for the maintenance and services of the temples in recognition to the divine blessing for the military victories.
- 8 One could be Kaji under the king in civil-function and commander of the military unit in the field

during the war.

- 9 So sometimes in the history of Nepal during and after the unification, civilian leaders such as Bhimsen Thapa were able to lead the country with the support of military in spite of the then system that provided de-jure power of the country to the incumbent king.
- 10 A system of yearly recruitment, renewal and removal of civil-military functionaries adopted by the ruler in Nepal, on the basis of no formal rule and regulation but of being influenced by the person or dearest or nearest of the ruler.
- 11 Dinesh Raj Pant (ed.), Sri 5 Badamaharajdhiraj Prithvinarayanshahako Dibyopadhesha, Kathmandu: Ministry of Information and Communication/HMG/Nepal, 2059 VS, pp14-17.
- 12 The members of this group of royal relatives could enjoy real power only as regent for a minor king or as a Chautaria, but not all of them could be accommodated as Chautarias.
the dissatisfaction in the King's brothers and female members was characterized by intense rivalry for real power.
- 13 Baburam Acharya, *Aba Yasto kahilyae Nahos (Never Again)*, Kathmandu: Sri Krishna Acharya, 2004.
- 14 Bhuwan Lal Joshi and Leo E. Rose, (1966) *Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of Political Acculturation* (Kathmandu: Mandala Publications, reprinted 2004, pp.23-25.
- 15 Junior queen of King Rajendra had stepped into controlling the military first for causing the fall of Bhimsen Thapa who had consolidated power by the means of military establishment and command. The same queen had developed a military platoon named Hanuman Dal to secure her position and seize power from Gagan Singh Thapa, one of the potential threats to her, though the latter had enjoyed power of the state with the backing of military.
- 16 Under the Jangi Rule introduced by Jang Bahadur Rana Jangi Adda, the office of the Army, ruled the country on the basis of role of succession entirely on the basis of military hierarchy. Vitalizing the role of the military in politics, Maharaja prime minister appointed to this office with its supreme and autocratic character was made stronger by the law of succession. The hierarchy of the ruling system under the Rana is as given : (1). Maharaja Sreetin Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of army, (2). Commander-in-chief General, (3). Senior Commanding-General for the west, (4). Commanding-General for the West, (5). Commanding-General for the East, (6). Commanding-General for the South, (7). Commanding-General for the North, (8). Generals, (9). Lieutenant-Generals, (10). Major-Generals, (11). Lieutenant-Colonels, (12). Colonels. See in detail, Satis Kumar, *Rana Polity in Nepal: Origin and Growth*, New Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. PVT. LTD, 1993
- 17 Ganesh Raj Sharma, *B.P Koirala ko Atmabritanta*, Kathmandu: Jagadamba Publisher, 1997: pp 159-160.
- 18 R.S Chauhan, *The Political Development in Nepal 1950-70: Conflict between Tradition and Modernity*, New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1971:234-35
- 19 The political environment, people's expectation with state and government were changed but the old structure especially the palace and the security sectors could not be the changed. How the palace was involved to make 'incompetent' the government in providing security to the royal family members, how the security sector was devoted to the royal palace and how the existence of the interim government was neglected could be understood from the controversial Guheashwori incident. What was surprising was that some innocent people belonging to the political parties were arrested by the security force in the accusation of physical attack to members of royal family including queen Aiswarya at Guheshwori, Katmandu. Neither the Home minister nor the Prime minister was informed about the incident. As clarified by the Home Minister about helplessness of the interim government, "neither police nor army, was totally under [their] control. Nor did they [the leaders in government] support the arrests" Mahes C. Regmi., *Nepal Press Digest*, 17 June

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- 1990.
- 20 Rising Nepal, 24 April, 1990
 - 21 (in an interview with BBC. As he told to BBC correspondent that Samaj, 11 July, 1990).
 - 22 The king stated that he was “confident that all Nepali will rise to the occasion and extend full cooperation to [prime minister and Council of Ministers]...in the discharge of their duties in the interests of Nepal and the well-being of the Nepali people”(Rising Nepal, 25 April, 1990 and Gorkhapatra, 25 April 1990
 - 23 According to the statement of Home Minister, “...The situation can be controlled without using force. As Home Minister, I pay tributes to the bravery to the police men who were killed or injured on April 23. Strong action will be taken against any such action which hurts the morale and confidence of the police”. He expressed with the “confidence that the Police, on their part, would perform their duty with dedication”.
 - 24 The king formed the Constitutional Reform Recommendation Commission without agreement or advice of the Interim Government, the step taken by the King was against the word and spirit of the Interim Constitution The commission included the so-called “liberals”. But he was compelled to leave tradition, term and spirit of the word “Reform” after the IPM threatened and overwhelming criticism came from anywhere.
 - 25 In spite of the rejection several times of the request of Commander-in-Chief of RNA to CRC Chief-commissioner for seeing the latter in his office, the former was allowed to meet in the latter’s residence. The Commander-in-Chief of RNA had proposed— sovereignty should be vested with the monarch, RNA should be under the king who is neutral and above the party-politics, out of 11, majority members of National Security Council should be from RNA personnel, and king should be Supreme Commander of chief of RNA.
 - 26 In addition to pressuring the COCRC by the king to publish the constitution, Prime Minister Bhattarai was under pressure due to the king-military tandem during the whole period of constitution-drafting process. See in detail,, Martin Hoftun, et al., People Politics and Ideology: Democracy and Social Change in Nepala, Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point, 1999:194
 - 27 The argument of the Commander-in-Chief of RNA was that running the constitutional monarchical multiparty system was difficult in such a dual ruling system where supreme power of the state was with the king and ruling power with the people’s representative who could misuse or politicize national armed strength, the RNA. See in, Mukunda Regmi Sambaidhanik Bikas ra Nepal Adhirajyako Sambidhan-Bhag 2 (constitutional development and the Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal-part two), Kathmandu: Sita Devi Regmi and others 2004, p1361..
 - 28 Meanwhile, officially the Military Operation and Staff Duties Unit of the G.Branch of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) Headquarters (HQ) distributed a circular to all Royal Army units for suggestions of RNA that were to be submitted later to the CRC on behalf of the RNA: “His Majesty should remain the Supreme Commander –in-Chief and Field Marshal of the Royal Nepali Army. Sovereignty must be vested in His Majesty, who should also control the army. The Post of Commander-in-Chief should have a constitutional status as before, and appointment to the post must be made by His Majesty. The Royal Nepali Army traditionally worships God Mahadeva and Goddess Kali, and Hindu ceremonies are performed at every barracks, hence Nepal must remain a Hindu State. Officially, the Military Operation and Staff Duties Unit of the G.Branch of the Royal Army Headquarters sent a circular (No. 1103/46/179) on 9 Ashadh, 2047 (23 June 1990) to all Royal Army units directing them to submit the suggestions to the CRC. These suggestions were submitted to the CRC later on behalf of the RNA, Saptahik Bimarsha, 6 July, 1990 as quoted in M.C Regmi, Nepali Press Digest, July 1990:300).
 - 29 (Article 30(1&2), The Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal, 1990, HMG/Nepal, 1990.
 - 30 According to article 35(2), “Except as otherwise expressly provided as to be exercised exclusively

by His Majesty or at His discretion or on the recommendation of any institution or official, the powers of His Majesty under this Constitution shall be exercised upon the recommendation and advise, and with the consent of the Council of Ministers. Such recommendation, advice and consent shall be submitted through the Prime Minister”.

- 31 No question could be raised against any activity preformed by the king according to Article 31.
- 32 (Article 115(1))
- 33 (Article 115(1,3 & 4)), Ibid.
- 34 Certain articles were left unclear. Whether or not a royal discretion was retained and used to exert as his power by the king. In particular, article 53(4) stated that the king “may” (sakibaksine) dissolve the House of Representatives and call fresh elections on the recommendation of the prime minister. Did this mean that the king was free to act on the recommendation if he chose to do so, or that the prime minister was free to make a recommendation which the king must then follow?
- 35 In 1994, the king accepted the proposal of PM G.P. Koirala whose party NC had got majority in HR, to dissolve the house and go to general election. In 1996,. He supported the same proposal by Man Mohan Adhikari, PM of minority government that had lost the confidence of other alliance partners in HR, but the Supreme Court issued a verdict against the acceptance. But in 1998, PM Surya Bahadur Thapa, technically enjoying the confidence of the House failed to get the house dissolved because of the king, who acted on the advice of Supreme Court that “would not be appropriate to give any opinion to the king against the elected PM with the confidence of the HR. Thus, no uniform standard seemed to have followed neither by the King nor by the Supreme Court.
- 36 (Article 119(1))
- 37 (Article 119(2))
- 38 Article 118(3)), Ibid.
- 39 (Article 68(2)), Ibid.
- 40 A bill famously known as Citizenship Bill introduced by the government as finance bill had been nullified by the king after both houses passed and sent it for approval of the king for formalization it as a law in 1999. The king had no right to kill any bill introduced by the government as finance bill.
- 41 Article 13, Ibid
- 42 Lok Raj Baral, *Oppositional Politics in Nepal*, Kathmandu: Himal books, 2007 .second edition.
- 43 After Royal massacre in June 2001, the Maoists organized demonstrations against the massacre and also continued to keep up the military pressure by attacking several police posts including Holery in Rolpa killing 14 and taking 69 policemen hostage on the birthday of the new king. Having failed to rescue the abducted policemen by the RNA, Koirala resigned on 19 July 2001. See, *Rising Nepal*, July 20, 2001
- 44 (1) Koirala, prime minister mostly after 1990 tried to engage RNA in developmental activities instead of its professional and organizational development, thinking RNA as “king’s army” (2) he set up para-military forces in 2000 in spite of the RNA opposition presumably on the prompting of the palace the creation of a separate APF under the Ministry of Home, (3) the fund assigned for Integrated Security Development Programme (ISDP)⁴⁵ in 1998 was preferred to be used by the police instead of the RNA, (4) The mutual antipathy between the army and police was the competition to commandeer resources but civil government always prioritized police force rather than RNA. (5) Koirala did not care to fulfill the preconditions of the RNA for its mobilizations in 2001: Maoists should be declared as terrorist, TADA should be either introduced, State of Emergency (SOE) should be imposed all over the country,⁴⁶ and all party should approve such

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mobilization. But he thought that such preconditions would not only curtail civil rights and liberties but power and authority of the PM also guaranteed in the constitution.

- 47 Maintain peace and security in the country, holding of general election and negotiating with the Maoists were the major responsibilities of the then governments. But the RNA including other security agencies did not help the government to fulfill even one of its responsibilities. See in detail, Jaya Prakash Anand, Akhtiyarko Thuna: Mero Samjhana (Under Custody of the Commission for Abuse of Authority: My Remembrance,, Kathmandu: Madheshi Human Right Protection Center, 2004.
- 48 RNA's rigidity to continue the SOE⁴⁹ and not to return to barrack "without any result", became the first suicidal step towards weakening democracy not only leading to split the largest democratic party, NC on 22 May 50, but to provide a the chance to the king to declare surprisingly⁵¹ the PM "incompetent to fulfill responsibilities⁵², dissolve the House of Representatives on 16 June and take also the executive power in his hand. After changing three governments under his favorites, he formed government under his leadership on 1st February 2004, imposed SOE, ban political parties, tried to restrict political activities, put most political leader under house arrest. Civil society, including media and the NGOs were controlled. Stern actions were taken against the private FM stations and newspapers.
- 53 Indra Adhikari, "Democracy and Prolems of Democratization in Nepal", V.A. Pai Panandiker and Rahul Tripathi (eds.), Towards Freedom in South Asia: Democratization, Peace and Regional Cooperation,, kanark Publishers PVT LTD 2008, p73.
- 54 12 Point understanding between the partiers and the Maoists on November 22, 2005 helped to accelerate the movement as these parties jointly "call[ed] upon the civil society, professional organizations, various wings of parties, people of all communities and regions, press and intellectuals to actively participate in the peaceful movement" (article 1) "ending autocratic monarch" (Article 2). Main commitments of the Understanding were to establish absolute democracy through restoration of the parliament along with the force of agitation, forming an all-party government with complete authority, holding elections to a constituent Assembly through dialog and understanding with the Maoists that only can resolve existing conflict in the country and transfer the state power completely to the people. See, Article 11, 12 Point Understanding between parties and the Maoists, 22 November 2005.
- 55 Indra Adhikari, "Emerging Civil-Military Ties", The Kathmandu Post, 5 July 2008.
- 56 See the text, Historic declaration of the House of Representatives, Kathmandu: Government of Nepal, 18 May 2006, see also The Himaliyan Times, 19 May 2006.
- 57 Article 114(2), The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063 (2007), Kathmandu: government of Nepal, 2007.
- 58 According to the Article 144 (3) of the Interim Constitution, the Council of Ministers shall control, mobilize and manage the Nepal Army in accordance with the law. The council of Ministers shall, with the consent of the political parties and by seeking the advice of the concerned committee of the Legislature-Parliament, formulate an extensive work plan for the democratization of the Nepal Army and implement it. And Article 145(5) "[s]tates except in the case of mobilization of the Nepal Army because of natural calamities, the decision made by the Council of Ministers of the Government of Nepal for the mobilization of the army shall be presented to a especial committee prescribed by the Legislature-Parliament within a month of the decision, and be approved accordingly", Ibid.
- 59 The Council constitutes Prime Minister as Chairperson, Defense, Home and three other ministers designated by the Prime minister as members. Contrary to the constitutional provision, Finance and External Affair ministers also are included among three designated ministers according to the Army Act 2006. And the Secretary of the Ministry of Defence as secretary of the NDC, see

Article 145 (3), *Ibid.*

- 60 According to article 144(4)...determination of the appropriate number of the Nepal Army, its democratic structure and National inclusive character shall be developed, and training shall be imparted to the army in accordance with the norms and values of democracy and human rights.
- 61 The strength of NA is about 93000 now.
- 62 Its higher level decision making body is dominated by fully "High Caste Hindu Male from Hill".
- 63 People from Tarai and Himalyan region but other marginalized and indigenous communities also have less access to the Army even in soldiers.
- 64 The orientation of NA from its formation is for the safety of king, crown and country more preferably than people as Nepali ruler used to orient the Military for the security of "I" myself, "my family" and "my country" not for the security to the right of the people, see in detail, Baburam Acharya, *Aba Yasto kahilyae Nahos (Never Again)*, Kathmandu: Sri Krishna Acharya, 2004.
- 65 Barsa Man Pun "Ananta", CA member from Maoists, and One of the key commander of PLA during the Maoists insurgency, told in an interview taken by the researcher on 22 may 2008.
- 66 See in detail, Agreement on Monitoring of Management of Arms and Armies, 28 November 2006.
- 67 Agreement on Monitoring of Management of Arms and Armies was concluded by the Interim Government and the Maoists party concluded on 28 November 2006 in the presence of UNMIN.
- 68 Most agreements concluded between the SPA and the Maoists accepted the need for "Professionalization of PLA and Democratization of NA".
- 69 Prime Ministers Dahal told, "I am confused, whether I am the Prime Minister of the country or rebellion leader" http://www.telegraphnepal.com/news_det.php?news_id=4527, "who can stop us to integrate PLA into NA, while the government is ours", and "it is impiousness (pakhandipan) to talk about politics without violence" etc., see, <http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2008/dec/dec14/news13.php>.
- 70 Maoists which formed the coalition government after CA election became largest party, other forces have less faith on the commitment of the Maoists on multiparty democracy as Maoists supremo, Puspa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) defined the democracy as transitional democracy towards establishing for Peoples' Republic. He defined the democracy responding the proposal of Kiran Vidhya in National Plenum, for declaring Nepal as People's Republic, <http://www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?sec=1&id=1560>
- 71 The Maoists resolution passed in Kharipati, Bhaktapur Kathmandu, in December 2008 says:
- Of the three stages of the Maoist People's War, the Maoist revolution in Nepal has currently reached the stage of strategic offence with its own indigenous characteristics.
 - The PLA's main role is to serve as a force to complete the revolution and prevent counter revolution. It has to prove itself as a force of creativity, firmness, offence, dynamism and invincibility.
 - Prepare the PLA politically and ideologically for the offensive to complete the revolution.
 - The PLA will undergo ideological and political training on Prachandapath and MLM (Marxism, Leninism and Maoism). The training will be at basic, intermediate and advanced levels.
 - There will be regular interactive meetings with the party committee in the army.
 - The integration of the PLA will be used in a manner that will further the cause of proletarianism and revolution. The issue of army integration should be used in this context.
- 72 Special Commission for Military Integration has been formed including 2 members from each four major parties in CA—NC, CPN(UML), MPRF and the Maoists under the chairmanship of the PM, Puspa Kamal Dahal.
- 73 The issues of ex-PLA integration was dealt in a package with other several issues. None of them has been fulfilled by the Maoists. So other parties also have taken the issue as Maoists issues

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that the PLA integration may be used by the Maoists as strategy not only to influence but also weaken military, only one stabilized institution of the country— for strengthening their party and its position

- 74 All of them might have no interest to serve in NA because of different causes, as their aim/interest to join PLA might be different. Their mother parties have been romanticized them advocating that the combatants should be integrated in NA. Views from some combatants has come out that they are involved in PLA to work for the Maoists Party not for integrating in NA or job in security agencies in the state. See, the republica...
- 75 Samuel P. Huntington , *The Soldier and the state: Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1957:72
- 76 Ganesh Raj Sharma, *B.P Koirala ko Atmabritanta*, Kathmandu: Jagadamba Publisher, 1997: pp 159-160.
- 77 Ministry of Defense allowed military to initiate recruitment process for maintaining the agreed strength of NA but turned out from the decision under the pressure of PLA—either to stop the NA recruitment or to allow it for the same.
- 78 Indra Adhikari, *Kantipur Dainiki*, “Chisido Sarkar-Sena Sambandha” (Cooling Civil-Military Relation), Kathmandu: 1 February 2009
- 79 See, <http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=177693>, <http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=177698>,
- 80 The Chief of Army Staff had received a memorandum from the conflict victims for initiating to settle their problem, and gave a lecture saying that no compromise in the quality of military is possible in Nepal. It was come while the Maoists were advocating about the integration of PLA into Nepal Army.

Buddhism and Environmental Crisis

Malvika Ranjan

Global environmental crisis is demanding our attention with ever increasing urgency, and attempts have been made to deal with this crises through a variety of channels including science and technology. In the struggle to sustain the earth's environment as viable for future generations ,the role of religion is yet to be fully explored,because religions help to shape our attitudes towards nature in both conscious and unconscious ways.Religions suggest how we should treat other humans and how we should relate to nature.These values make up the ethical orientation of a society. Religions thus generate worldviews and ethics that underlie fundamental attitudes and values of different cultures and societies.¹ Ignorance of religion prevents environmental studies to achieve its goals, however for though science and technology share important features of human culture with religion, they leave unexplored, essential wellsprings of human motivation and concern that shape the world as we know. No understanding of the human society is adequate without the grasp of the religious life that constitute the human societies.².

Exploring the role of religion in combating the environmental crisis,the initiative to organize the first ever confluence of Religion and environmental issues was taken by World Wildlife Fund in 1986 in Assisi , Italy. This interfaith ceremony held in the Basilica of St Francis culminated with the declaration on Nature by the five participating religions –Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism.³

This meet set going a series international discourses seriously contemplating on how religion can come to the rescue of nature and it was found that every major religion contain values and beliefs that support a conservation ethics for example 'Ahimsa' in Hinduism , Buddhism ,and Jainism. Additionally , many religions denounce materialistic or selfish attitudes , emphasizing simple living and modest consumption of material goods. Any religious principle that deals with the use and distribution of resources may have implications for conservation. Buddhism is one such religion which embodies principles, that ecologists and other conservation experts explain , is urgently needed, if destruction of the natural environment is to be halted. Ancient

Indian religions - Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism have firm belief in the philosophy of Karma i.e. all beings reap the fruits of their action. Good Karma is described as generating merit, whereas bad karma is described as generating demerit. ⁴

The Buddha believed that one could not avoid experiencing the result of a karmic deed.,once it was committed.⁵ In the Anguttar Nikaya, it is stated that karmic results are experienced either in this life or in future lives. Therefore human beings should guard against their actions.⁶

Dhammapada, clearly explains, why should one, abstain from indulging in violence or harming other beings- “All are afraid of the rod(punishment), all fear from death. Taking oneself as the example, one shall not strike, shall not let others strike. All are afraid of the rod, life is dear to all. One, who strikes with a rod on beings that are longing for happiness, will not secure happiness after death. One, who does not strike with a rod on beings that are longing for happiness, will secure happiness after death.”⁷. Thus it is evident that the theory of Karma is very much relevant to the cause of nature conservation.

The Buddhist principle of ‘Paticca Samuppada’, has great ecological significance. This theory of ‘interdependent co-arising’ explains that there is a reason behind the existence of any phenomenon or situation . In other words – everything is interrelated in this world, as rightly explained by Dalai Lama-. ‘As a Buddhist, I believe in the interdependence of all things ,the interrelationship among the whole spectrum of plant and animal life, including the elements of nature which express themselves as mountains, valleys, rivers, sky and sunshine.’ As all are inter-dependent, Buddhism advocates equality and sanctity of all beings. ⁸

The Philosophy of Sunyavaad is an extention of the philosophy of Paticca Samuppada. This philosophy expounded by Nagarjuna explains that since all things are interdependent, they have no real independent identity. All phenomenon are therefore fundamentally insubstantial and empty or ‘Sunya’(empty or void)and thus have the same nature.Since they are equal, the question of hierarchy does not arise. Hence man is not hierarchically superior to nature and has not right to exploit it.⁹ Buddhism preaches about being sensitive towards all the elements of Nature because man’s existence on earth is depended on these elements.

The following lines from Suttanipatta throw light on this aspect of Buddhism.- “know ye the grasses, and the trees... know ye the worms, and the moths, and the different sorts of ants...know ye also the four footed animals small and great, the serpents , the fish, ... the birds”¹⁰.The truth that ‘Nature nurtures mankind’ is often forgotten

by insensitive and ungrateful individuals, who harm the elements of nature without this realization about the repercussions of their own actions. The following lines from Anguttar Nikaya reflects this aspect of human insensitivity and ingratitude- “ How amazing , how astonishing it is that a man should be so evil as to break a branch off the tree after eating his fill. Suppose the tree was to bear no more fruit”¹¹.

Christopher Chappell, who has contributed immensely in the field of Buddhism and Environment, has revealed that the Jataka accounts of Buddha’s former births give a fairly deep insight into the Buddhist principle of respect and love for all, humans and the animals alike. Of the 550 stories of the Jatakas, accepted as canonical by the Theravadins, half mention animals as the central characters¹² .Many tales tell about Buddha’s existence as an animal in his previous life .This message, that ‘all life is interlinked -lays the foundation for the Buddhist ethics of Nature. As all lives are interlinked, Buddhism advocates reverence and respect for all lives. The following prayers from Suttanipatta, for the wellbeing of all creatures throws light on this sensibility of equality and justice in Buddhism. -

May all, be blessed with peace always.
All creatures weak and strong,
All creatures great and small,
Creatures unseen and seen,
Born or awaiting birth,
May all be blessed with peace. ¹³

Buddhist guidelines explicitly lay down religious sanctions against the indiscriminate use of trees and plants “Even the branch of the tree must never be cut, where beneath the shade I have ever sheltered taken rest or slept” Buddha had once proclaimed.¹⁴ The earliest monastic rules enshrined in the ‘Patimokkha’ contain numerous injunctions against environmental irresponsibility. Some are basically sound advice governing personal hygiene, but others are cautioned not to harm sentient beings. Followers of Buddhism are forbidden to cut down trees or dig the earth because that would destroy small life forms and they were cautioned against dropping a vessel of water containing fish or any other living being on the ground. ¹⁵

It has been discovered that the belief of the interrelatedness of Nature with man, and the importance of Ahimsa or non violence, has led to the development of Buddhist monasteries as sanctuaries for wildlife .Ecologists now turn to the ancient Buddhist monasteries as sanctuaries to find ecologically balanced reserves. ¹⁶

Another central idea of Buddhism is compassion and service. In the Mahayana

tradition, spiritual adepts called 'Bodhisattvas' dedicate their lives to serve others and save all creatures from suffering. Bodhisattvas vow to return to the earth again and again through reincarnation, rather than attain nirvana .They come back to suffer the trials and tribulations of life in order to help every individual of every species to escape from ongoing suffering and rebirth. This has been emphatically explained in the following lines from the Vajradhvaja Sutra where a Bodhisattva resolves- "I take upon myself, the burden of all sufferings, I am resolved to do so, I will endure it... The whole world of living beings ,I must rescue, from the terrors of birth, of old age , of sickness, of death and rebirth, of all kinds of moral offence, of all states of woe..."¹⁷.Regarding Compassion, The Dalai Lama has said-'If you want others to be happy, practice compassion.If you want to be happy, practice compassion.American monk Bhikku Bodhi observes-'Compassion supplies the complement to loving kindness, whereas loving kindness has the characteristic of wishing for the welfareand happiness of others, compassion has the characteristic of wishing that others be free from suffering, a wish to be extended without limits to all living beings.Compassion arises by entering into the subjectivity of others by sharing their interiority in a deep and total way.It springs up by considering that all beings like ourselves wish to be free from suffering"¹⁸ Buddhism thus presents a perception and awareness of nature through interrelatedness, oneness, kindness and compassion for all living beings.

The Following lines from the ' Buddhist Declaration of Nature' presented by Venerable Lungrig Namgyal Rinpoche in the Assisi meet, sums up the entire philosophy and reverence for nature in the life of every Buddhist:

“ There is a natural relationship between a cause and its resulting consequences. Therefore , a human undertaking motivated by a healthy and positive attitude constitutes one of the most important causes of happiness, while undertakings generated through ignorance and negative attitude brings about suffering and misery. And this positive human attitude is, in the final analysis rooted in genuine and unselfish compassion and loving kindness that seeks to bring about light and happiness for all sentient beings. Hence Buddhism is a religion of love, understanding and compassion and committed towards the ideal of non violence.”.¹⁹

According to Helena-Norberg –Horge, who has written extensively about Buddhism in Ladakh, the people have become familiar with the notion of Sunyata, which is interpreted as the view that all things ultimately dissolve into the web of

relationships.²⁰

All over the world, many Buddhist monasteries and , institutes are engaged in environmental awareness programmes Buddhist wats who are conscious of environmental issues and live their lives caring for nature are referred as 'Green Buddhists. They not only focus on the theoretical aspects of the relationship of Buddhism and nature ,but also apply these theories to day to day life .The 'Green Buddhists' emphasise on caring for nature outside the being , but also nature within each of us²¹ .They believe that it is only by grooming their inner nature, can human beings offer to take care of their external nature.. The 'Myanmaar Sangha, apart from serving important social and community functions imparts to the common folks of Burma , the Buddhist principles of ahimsa',and compassion. They inspire all to live in harmony with each other and with nature.²² .In Bangkok,abbot of the Wat Bupparam in Chiang Mai city runs vocational training schemes where monks are taught to help tribal people to dig wells and build roads ,besides other activities of social relevance.²³ The Mahabodhi international Meditation Centre, near Leh in Ladakh is engaged in a wide range of spiritual, social and nature conservation activities.²⁴

Steven Kanji Ruhl ,currently serving as the minister for the Appalachian Zen House near State College ,Pennsylvania has identified 10 Green Buddhists ,foremost amongst them being The Dalai Lama who has been enthusiastically campaigning for wildlife conservation and has also issued religious ruling against wearing tiger and leopard skins as garments.²⁵ The Dalai lama has also condemned the activities of such groups such as Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, a non profit marine conservation society for adopting violent means in their pursuit.²⁶.Joining hands with the Dalai Lama is Zen Buddhist Leader Thich Nhat Hanh who proclaims “ Buddhism is the strongest form of Humanism we have It can help us to live with responsibility, compassion and living kindness. ¹⁴ He speaks about environmental harmony 'which is impossible if we don't have a global ethic and the global ethic that the Buddha devised.²⁷ .Close on his heels is yet another renowned Green Buddhist, Wendy Johnson,who has been practicing Zen meditation for 35 years and has led meditation retreats nationwide since 1992 . She has been teaching gardening and environmental education to the public since 1980s. For Zen activist Wendy Johnson, the Buddhist philosophy is the inspirational force behind her work leading walks, practicing organic gardening and teaching.²⁸.

Ranging from efforts of the Dalai Lama to have the entire Tibetan plateau declared

a “natural park” and wildlife refuge called the Zone of Ahimsa, to strategies by monks in Thailand to prevent over-logging, to Thich Nhat Hanh’s ecological awareness campaigns within his order, to the decades-long commitment of other Buddhists such as Wendy Johnson and Joanna Macy to honour and protect wilderness and sustainable human cultures and all living beings, the Green Buddhist movement is dynamic, vitally important, and inspiring to Buddhists and Non-Buddhists alike. Green Buddhism invokes the fundamental Buddhist principle of interconnectedness, in order to express the truth of the profound interdependence of everything within the cosmos, humans linked to animals and plants and oceans and mountains and stars in a harmonious network of interbeing. This realization of interdependence immediately instills a sense of responsibility in mankind, to nurture Nature. Summarizing about this firm belief of the Buddhists, Stephanie Kaza, a buddhist and a professor of Environmental Studies, University of Vermont, writes-

“If we engage in green living in more depth, it becomes an expression of our deepest moral values. The work of green living becomes less a chore and more a locus of ethical development. We conserve water not because we should be frugal but because we respect earth’s resources. This shift and understanding can be quite profound. The conservation moves from personal sacrifice to real consideration of the nature of our connection with the earth. .When we come to see ourselves as part of the great web of life, in relation with all beings, we are naturally drawn to respond with compassion.”²⁹ It is with this conviction, that the ‘Green Buddhist’s are forging ahead towards the aim of greening the environment.

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Rwandan Conflict and the Process of Identity Formation

Prashant Kumar

The case of Rwandan genocide is an unforgettable blot recorded as one of the most heinous of conflicts in the human history. Popularly known as the conflict of identity between Hutus and Tutsis, this conflict had multi-layered aspects to it involving many major players who were the catalyst to the massive bloodshed in this case. In fact it presents an interesting study of how differences of identity are portrayed as an incompatible construct and how manipulations of facts and reality can lead to major crises. An important question posed by the Rwandan case is that, “are differences in identity really incompatible, or having inevitably conflictual consequences, be in latent or violent forms?” or to put it differently, how are differences of identity formed, is it a natural construction based on the differences in cultures, habits and other ‘othering’ traits of the other community which was certainly not the case of Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. Does that mean that identities are mere artificial constructions? This paper intends to dwell upon these issues taking the Rwandan case as a study.

Rwanda has been presented as a case of identity-clash which saw one of its worst manifestations in the form of ethnic-cleansing and genocide which the whole world saw in ghastly awe. The kind of horrific dimensions of human tragedy witnessed in the case of Rwanda was often reduced in causality to identity related issues between Hutus and Tutsis, the two major ethnic groups in Rwanda who have not been known to be hostile to each other historically rather present a case of being harmoniously living communities. This paper seeks to explore this artificial construct of differences, its role in developing and portraying ‘the other’ in the case of Rwandan crisis. The paper thus, will try to give a brief analysis of the “identity formation” and the subsequent process of “othering” drawing on and building on the various theories propounded in the larger discipline of social sciences. The second part of the paper will associate it with the Rwandan case to test the validity of the case as largely an “artificial construct”.

Though there have been ample research and theorisation of identity related conflict from multiple angles e.g. socio-psychological perspectives, their application to the international politics and also their applicability is somehow problematic because of

the different level of analysis on which international politics is based. But as far as 'identity' is concerned, it has an element of 'belongingness', but it raises a question as to whether it means that it should necessarily involve 'othering' also, and if the answer is in affirmative what is the threshold, the thin line of demarcation between the two phenomena.

Before dwelling on these issues in details, it needs to be clarified at the very outset that why the Rwandan experience serves as a case to be studied which is owing to the following reasons. Firstly, Rwanda is a relatively compact country in terms of social composition, which ordinarily should have made the evolution of a nation-state not very tough and also the inter-group relations less prone to conflict. Second, the level of human tragedy that occurred in Rwanda since its formation as an independent state in 1962, peaking with the genocide of 1994, has really been a very disturbing fact. In the words of Adejumobi (2001: 88-89),

"The Rwanda narrative depicts how the colonial construction of group identity was factored into the structures and the processes of the state system, a phenomenon that thwarted the logic of a common national identity and equal citizenship for the people of Rwanda."

The Process of Identity Formation: Identity issues have seen their emergence in the post-cold war era like never before. There have been various kinds of explanations for the formation or construction of identities at the individual, group or societal level. While the former draws mostly from psychological perspectives, the other two have sociological angles to it. Chandra (2001: 7) argues that the primordialist view, which claims identity becomes fixed once it is acquired (either socially or biologically), has been largely replaced by the constructivist view over the past several decades. While all constructivists agree that individuals have multiple identities and that causal factors can trigger a shift from one identity to another, they disagree on the relative importance of these causal factors (e.g., industrialization, colonialism, economic opportunism, or entrepreneurship) (Chandra 2001, 8)¹ However, Postmodern theorists in the humanities have challenged the traditional conceptions of identity by arguing that the fixed subject of liberal humanistic thinking is an anachronism that should be replaced by a more flexible individual whose identity is fluid, contingent, and socially constructed. Social scientists have also intensified their longstanding interest in the concept of identity in recent years (Jenkins, 1996). Sociologists have pondered and explored the tension between individual identity and the constraints of social structure. Anthropologists have examined the cultural expression of identity,

its meanings, and how it is maintained at group boundaries. Social psychologists have focused on the multifaceted and situationally contingent nature of individual identity. They have also identified social identity as a powerful ingredient in the development of ingroup bias and intergroup conflict.²

It is this social identity theory which will be discussed in detail owing to its seeming applicability in the Rwandan case. The Rwandan case whose details will be discussed in the next section of the paper presents a case of construction of identity in a group which heightens to such a level of self-consciousness and simultaneous othering of the other group in the society that it demands a combination of socio-psychological approaches to study it in details. Social identity theory tries to do the same. There are two distinct branches of social identity theory: the version developed by Tajfel (1981) and Tajfel and Turner (1979), known as social identity theory, and an offshoot developed by Turner and colleagues, referred to as self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). Both theories acknowledge the origins of social identity in cognitive and motivational factors, although they place differing emphasis on them (Hogg, 1996, p. 67). The earliest versions of social identity theory developed by Tajfel (1981) and Tajfel and Turner (1979) placed key emphasis on the psychological motivations that lead a group member to endorse or disavow an existing group membership. Turner et al. (1987) have described this motive as a need among group members “to differentiate their own groups positively from others to achieve a positive social identity”³. In contrast, the self-categorization theory developed by Turner et al. (1987) has concentrated on the cognitive underpinnings of social identity. Self-categorization theory built on Tajfel’s earliest cognitive formulations to further develop the cognitive factors that promote categorization of oneself as a group member. As noted by Turner et al. (1987), self-categorization theory is a “cognitive elaboration” of Tajfel’s earlier theory that provides an explanation for how individuals come to identify and “act as a group”⁴.

Tajfel concluded that cognitive factors-the perceptual distortions that arise from the accentuation of intergroup differences-could not on their own explain the emergence of intergroup discrimination and, in response, modified social identity theory to include additional motivational factors. However, Tajfel implicitly assumed that individuals labelled as group members would categorize themselves as such and internalize the group label as a social identity. Thus, according to social identity theory, additional motivational factors are needed to account for the development of intergroup discrimination but mere categorization is sufficient to explain the creation of social identity.

There is some evidence that category salience shapes identity. For instance, McGuire

and colleagues reported evidence that children in an ethnic minority in their classroom (and whose ethnicity is therefore more salient) are more likely to describe themselves in terms of their ethnicity; children in families where there are more members of the opposite gender are more likely to mention their gender when describing themselves. In a similar vein, Hogg and Turner (1985) found that increasing the salience of study participants' gender increases the likelihood that they think of themselves in gender-stereotypic terms. These findings received confirmation in a meta-analysis conducted by Mullen, Brown, and Smith (1992) in which group salience was found to promote the development of ingroup bias across a large number of studies.

It is not just the salience of existing categories, however, that influences the lability of social identities, according to self-categorization researchers: They believe that categories themselves change across social settings. According to self-categorization theory, individuals are more likely to think of themselves as members of social groups under conditions in which the use of a group label maximizes the similarities between oneself and other group members, and heightens one's differences with outsiders (Turner et al., 1987). Thus, categories and their prototypes spontaneously emerge and change with the attributes of category insiders and outsiders. Hogg et al. (1995) echoed this position when they noted that "social identity is highly dynamic: it is responsive, in both type and content, to intergroup dimensions of immediate social comparative contexts" (p. 261). Here, type refers to varying category salience, and content implies a change in the group prototype. In other words, Turner and colleagues believe that group prototypes vary across social settings and thus contribute further to identity shifts.

Thus the conclusions from social identity theory can be applied to the Rwandan case in the sense that the way this theory integrates social and psychological aspects to identity formation and the process of othering is very important in understanding a case like Rwanda where outside motivations have a long history of having hands in identity creation and subsequent entrenching of that identity so deep that in the collective psyche of one group (here the two ethnic categories of Hutus and Tutsis) that it not just shows ingroup bias but moves to the negative side of developing hostility towards the other. But the hand of a third party and the formation of category, labelling of that category is very important in such cases. The idea of additional motivations in this theory tries to present the same. It will be elaborated in details below.

Rwandan Case:

In social composition and identity, Rwanda is a fairly homogeneous country. Its three ethnic categories of the Tutsi, the Hutu and the Twa share the same language, type of social organization, often the same lifestyles, and have lived together with each other peacefully for centuries while sharing the same collective commitment to monarchical symbols. Colonialism radically transformed the social structures and identity formation of this society. It created rigid identity differentiation and sharp social distinctions among these groups. The background to this development was colonial cultural mythology and historiography of the Rwandese people, which sought to reconstruct the country's social reality and identity. Colonial historians and anthropologists were the precursors of this historical reconstruction. Using differences in physical traits they claimed that the groups in Rwanda were of different historical origins. The Tutsi were classified as of 'Hamitic' origin, the Hutu as Bantu, and the Twa as pygmies. A curious logic of racial superiority was injected into these scholars' analysis with the claim that the Tutsi were superior human beings than the others.

Our identities—are in great part a function of stories and assumptions operating within the politics of our societies. To the extent that a Hamitic vision of "Hutu" and "Tutsi" as fundamentally different people was the assumption behind Rwanda's social, political, and cultural institutions, Rwandans in effect became Hutu and Tutsi. Moreover, what the genocide of 1994 confirms is that stories do, in fact, kill. For once a vision of Hutu and Tutsi as fundamentally other had become entrenched into the collective imagination of Rwandans, such a story could easily be called upon to carry out and justify the killing of Tutsis. Over a century and a half after Speke told the story of the Tutsi as foreigners from Ethiopia, Hutu extremists were calling on their Hutu compatriots to send the Tutsis back to Ethiopia via the river. Within weeks, the Akangera River was literally flooded with bodies of dead Tutsis.

The origins of Rwanda's tragedy are recent, dating back to the 1930s. Before that, Hutus and Tutsis had for centuries, worked out a *modus Vivendi*. Of course, there had been wars, even massacres, but water found its level until the later colonialists sought to impose Western norms and values on an African milieu."⁵

Many scholars point to the established notion of Tribalism associated with the Rwandan case which is in fact biased. Scholars like John Lonsdale and many others have tried to deconstruct against this."The 1994 genocide in Rwanda had to do, in great part, with tribalism. I do, of course, realize that to admit that the 1994 genocide was a clear case of tribalism sounds like an easy and convenient explanation, which moreover seems to confirm Western impressions of Africa and Africans. For such

an admission gives the impression that Africans are naturally “tribal” or that tribalism is typically an African thing—a primitive mindset or a cultural trait—that so-called advanced societies have thankfully managed to leave behind.”⁶

The conflict in Rwanda has the tragedy of being portrayed as the natural outcome of cultural and biological differences between the two tribes Hutus and Tutsis but this is a false justification for a conflict which was actually the result of a long drawn process of construction, embedding and justification of certain identities in the general psyche of the people of Rwanda which was hard to change once firmly established. A number of scholars have now pointed out, before the colonial occupation of Rwanda, the Hutu and the Tutsi were not “clearly distinct and rigidly separated ethnic groups”⁷. This, of course, is not to say that Hutu-Tutsi categories were simply cooked up by the Belgian colonialists. In a very helpful study, Muhamood Mamdani traces the distinctions between the Hutu and the Tutsi back to the precolonial state of Rwanda but notes that Hutu and Tutsi operated as fluid “transethnic identities,” based on economic patterns (agricultural versus cattle grazing) and power relations.⁸

Mamdani’s work is highly significant, for it shows that rather than assuming that “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are identities that reflect either biological or cultural differences, they should be seen as political identities that were formed first and foremost through the state.⁹ Central to this formation was the role of colonial mythology, through which racially obsessed nineteenth-century Europeans came to view the Tutsi-Hutu differences operating in pre-colonial Rwanda as an essential *racial* difference, one that reflected ontological superiority and inferiority and one that came to play out historically as the conflict between invaders and natives. The European view of Africa as a dark continent and of Africans as incapable of any civilization greatly helped to shape the view of the Tutsi as a superior, non-indigenous race—Hamitic conquerors who helped set up civilization in the Christianity, tribalism, and the Rwandan genocide Great Lakes Region of East Africa. John Hanning Speke, the famous Nile explorer, plays a key role in the construction of what was later to become the unquestionable scientific canon of anthropological explanation. In his influential *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile*, he felt compelled to explain the apparently well-functioning and organized monarchical institutions that he encountered in the inter-lacustrine region of Eastern Africa. Since these developments were too refined to be Negro in origin, Speke concluded, they must be associated with the past arrival of a “conquering superior race.” These “carriers of a superior race,” who were the ancestors of the Tutsi, Speke wrote, must be “Caucasians in black skin” who may have had their origins in the north: “It appears

impossible to believe, judging from the physical appearance of the Wahuma, that they can be of any other race than the semin-Shem-Hamitic of Ethiopia . . . [descendants of] Christians of the greatest antiquity.”¹⁰ It is this Hamitic story—with the assumption that the Tutsi people were fundamentally a different race from the Hutu (foreign, genetically superior, a civilizing race; black Caucasians with origins in the north)—that became the unquestioned canon governing the decisions of German and later Belgian colonialists in the administration of Rwanda. The story played a particularly crucial role during the reforms of 1927–36, through which Belgian colonial power turned the Hamitic racial assumption into an institutional fact by making it the basis for reforms and changes in political, social, and cultural relations. The reforms were capped with a census that classified every citizen as either Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa—and each was issued an identity card reflecting one’s race. In this way, Rwandan society not only became racialized, but also the key institutions of Rwanda’s social, cultural, religious, and political life came to be dominated by the Tutsis, who as the Hamitic assumption went, were “the natural born leaders.”

Given this background, it is not difficult to see how the fluid and transnational Hutu-Tutsi relationships, which existed in pre-colonial Rwanda, came not just to be transformed, but “fixed” into stable racial identities of an “inferior-superior” type, identities that were reproduced within the history of the Rwandan state.¹¹

In the eyes of the colonial regimes (both German and Belgian), the Tutsi were considered to be the white men in black skins in Rwanda. As such, they were formally designated as the first class natives to whom decentralised local power and resources were to be devolved. The Hutu, though a majority of the population, relegated to the background. This identity reconstruction by the colonial state underwent three processes of social influence, which Herbert Kelman (1998) identifies as being central to identity formation and consolidation. These were compliance, identification and internalisation. All the social groups complied with the new identities conferred upon them (with the initial threat of force) and internalised them through a socialisation and generational cycle. In addition, those identities were codified with the colonial policy of separate identity cards for the groups.¹²

The colonial ideology of racial or group superiority among the native population had both normative and social consequences. In the former regard, the Tutsi identity became the standard or optimal identity by which other forms of social identities were to be measured. Its signs, symbols and meanings became the cultural base

for the society. In the latter regard, Tutsi identity came to be synonymous with power, wealth and influence. The Tutsi controlled the native authorities, were in charge of land in the localities, and were the major recipients of colonial education policy.¹³

The colonial state transformed what were flexible and complementary social categories into rigid ethnicities, engineered group identity competition through an inverse process of the domination of one group by another, and gradually undermined the basis of a common national identity and equal citizenship among the Rwandese.¹⁴

This study tried to look at the Rwandan case by deconstructing the stereotyped conclusions of simply identity clash made of conflicts where two or more groups or ethnicities are involved as in the case of Rwanda. What makes the Rwandan case so compelling to study especially with regard to this whole issue of identity formation is that this case involves not just the multiple actors, factors and motivations which had their role in not just constructing differences but in aggravating things, making things go out of hand, be it the external powers since the colonial era or even the state machinery later but when it came to find the main culprit for the disaster it was reduced to identity related conflict which was just an apparent instrument used to shed away from the huge responsibilities which had be borne by many major players and stakeholders. In the context of all these this paper tried to give an overview of social identity approach to study the identity creation which suggested outside, motivations as important in developing ingroup bias among group members even in cases where the group is based on very flimsy kind of affiliations. If it is to be extrapolated further the kind of hatred and hostility which developed in Rwanda among the two so-called ethnic groups which had earlier not very rigid boundaries and had history of shared practices, norms etc. certainly cannot be called an automated development or a sudden outbreak due to some immediate reasons or as it is very common to account to tribalism associated with Africa.. This paper tried through its elaboration of Rwandan case from a rich source to outrightly dismiss these ideas behind a human catastrophe of such a high scale and to bring in accountability of external factors in even creating identity differences, entrenching them and after a certain level of threshold point that leads to huge human disaster. Thus identity formation though has various explanations to it, for our case social identity theory proves to be a vital tool.

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Environmental Security and Peace Building: A Plea for a Theoretical Construct

Manoj Kumar Mishra

In the post cold war era '*redefining security*' writes David A. Baldwin has become something of a cottage industry (David A Baldwin, 1997:1). More interestingly arguments about whether the environment should be seen as a security issues range from those who believe that the securitization of the environment is the most important steps to securing the survival of humanity, to those who believe that its advocates are simply environmentalists cynically attempting to grab part of the governmental attention and spending that traditionally attached to security issues. It has been called by Myers as '*ultimate security*' and a '*pollution*' of true security by Deudney (Myers, 1993 and Deudney, 1990).

The discourse lies between these two extreme positions. The environmental issue has been probably received more attention than any of the other domains in the broadened security concept and there is a large and growing literature devoted to the intellectual and policy implication of the concept of environmental security. Approaches ranges from the more specific focus on the linkages between environmental change and violent (deadly) conflict to the possible role of environmental conservation, cooperation and collaboration in peace building.

Environmental security has been defined as concerning "the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises" (Buzan, 1991). Define thus; it clearly falls within the scope of security issue, since it encompasses the same dangers that focused so much attention on the issue of nuclear weapons during the cold war. Robert Kaplan arguing that accelerating environmental collapse will trigger increase in crime and ethnic conflict that will plunge the world into conflict-ridden anarchy.

That the environment emerged on the broadening security agenda in the past two decade is hardly surprising. Off late it has been observed that many developing countries are threatened by issues such as degradation or desertification than they are by the threats of external military forces. Tunisia has reflected this reality in its

national security doctrine by defining its struggle against desertification as a key part of its national defense efforts to contain and reverse the advances of the Sahara (Sheehan, 1999). Some are of the view that the advent of environmental security is an example of post materialistic world. Societies can be seen as operating in terms of “hierarchy of needs”, so that once the basic needs are met, there is a movement up the hierarchy, and as this happens, new ‘needs’ emerge. In this sense, a “hierarchy of security needs”, may be operating, so that developments such as economic development, economic globalization and the end of cold war have encouraged the development of an environmental security ‘need’ that was previously seem to be present (Sheehan, 2006:100).

Human versus the Natural Environment: The Never Ending Debate

If we look from a theoretical perspective there are two possible kinds of environmental security threats. The first are those that emanate from the natural environment, earthquakes, cyclones etc. The second are those from those are the result of human agencies impacting on the natural environment such as green house gas emissions resulting in climate change. There seems to be a consensus that it is the latter category i.e. the proper concern of environmental security. These are threats resulting from the way that the process of civilization has come to involve a manipulation of nature that has reached self defeating proportions as a result of massive population increased and the enormous growth of economic activity in the last century.

According to Barry Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, 1998). The environmental debate is really preserving existing levels of human civilization. The real concern is whether or not the ecosystems needed to preserve and further develop human civilization are sustainable. So the environmental security is thus not about humanity struggle with nature as such, but a problem of coping with the dynamics of its own post industrial cultures. Environmental security addresses threats to humanity posed by human impact upon the “natural” environment. It is about the effects of atmospheric change, deforestation, chemical pollution, soil erosion, etc. These are problems primarily induced by human activity. They may be the result of deliberate acts, or they may be caused by the unintended side effects of the pursuit of other objectives. It is not about dealing with natural disasters such as earthquakes as hurricanes. It is the results, not of humanity’s struggle against the unpredictable effects of nature, but of humanity’s struggle against itself. Environmental threats as Prins suggests that unlike military threats are “threats without enemies” (Prins, 1993).

To look at environmental security is such a way is that it does not make or require any link with war or violent conflict between human groups, as do the arguments of some other interpretations of environmental security threats. Environmental degradation is seen as a security problem because it impacts negatively on the health and well being of human beings. It represents direct existential threats to human in certain respects and therefore encourages a mindset that sees human's welfare and welfare of natural systems as being crucially linked (Mische, 1989).

The environmental security agenda

A number of issues can potentially be included as environmental security concerns. These are some of the categories given below (Sheehan, 2006:101&102)

- (A) Environmental security concerns include disruption of ecosystems, such as climate change, loss of biodiversity, deforestation, desertification, depletion of the ozone layer, and the various forms of pollution. These factors the natural environmental balance if local to global ecologies is being damaged by the activities of the human population.
- (B) The second concern is issues related to energy. This is related to the depletion of natural resources, different kinds of pollution involved in the storage and transportation of chemicals, oil and nuclear materials, and the problem of energy scarcities and uneven distribution.
- (C) The third category which can be included under the environmental security agenda is the effects of human population growth which include major population movements, excessive consumption and waste, pollution and overuse of limited natural resources.
- (D) The issues related to food scarcities and uneven food distribution, including famines and the loss of fertile soils and water resources in many parts of the world.

Many of the environmental security issues discussed above are criticized by various scholars like Simon Dalby and others. For Dalby it is the pressures of globalization, and the dynamics of post modern capitalism, that are the culprit, rather than population growth per se, because of "the accelerating processes of globalization that are interconnecting the world's economics and cultures in ways that often operate to undercut traditional economics and challenges the sustainability of agricultural and survival practices" (Simon Dalby, 1998).

Gwyn Prins is of the opinion that environmental security is like "threats without enemies", which is not the case. The basic logic of environmental security is that,

globally, humanity is living beyond the carrying capacity of the planet. "Carrying capacity" is defined as "the total patterns of consumption that the Earth's natural systems can support without undergoing degradation" (Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, 1998:81). Carrying capacity is influenced by numbers, technology and lifestyle. The highly developed countries of the 'West', their advanced consumer life styles make greater demands upon the planet resources than the lifestyles of the developing countries. The world's poorer countries are not the most to blame for global environmental problems, in that their lifestyle are far less demanding on global resources, but they are the most vulnerable to its consequences.

This leads to one major implication in terms of identifying the providers of security. In the cold war era discourse, the provider of security was clearly the state, and the instrumental providers were the armed forces. But when damage to the environment per se becomes part of the security problematic, it remains partly and crucially a responsibility of the state to seek to maximize security in this area, and yet it also becomes possible for NGO's communities, scientists and even common people to take on an important responsibility for enhancing environmental security for society as a whole.

Can the Environment be Securitized?

There have been various efforts to include environmental issues on the security agenda by a number of scholars. Arguing in this context Peter Gleick has linked the 'environment' to a number of other sectors, including the military and societal sectors, where security thinking embraces problems of population growth, transnational pollution, widespread poverty, and inequitable social system (Peter Gleick, 1991).

Those scholars who are against securitization of the environment are of the view that it is too amorphous a concept to be theorized. Marc Levy argues that "the environment", 'can refer to anything in which something takes place or which affects what people do; in other words, almost anything at all" (Marc Levy, 1995:37). He therefore argues that the term should be reserved for those issues that involve ecological feedback and equilibria, or are critical to the sustenance of human life (Marc Levy, 1995:38).

In 1991, Daniel Deudney resented a set of arguments against the securitization of the environment. Deudney said that environmental degradation and threats to military security were fundamentally different issues, for four main reasons (D. Deudney, 1991).

- (i) They are different kinds of threats. Human beings get killed by many kinds of like, accidents, illness, aging, but these are not seen as “security threats. If everything that could cause death of human beings be labeled a “security threat”, the team would lose any analytical usefulness it possessed.
- (ii) The scope, subject matter and source of threats to environmental and military security are different. Environmental threats may not be purely ‘national’ in character in terms of their causes, their consequences, or their solutions. This is not the case in traditional security threat perception.
- (iii) The degrees of intention of threats between environmental and military security differ greatly. Threats of violence are generally international, planned, organized, deliberate acts by human activities. Environmental threats, in contrast, are largely international. They are side effects of other activities.
- (iv) Finally, the organizations that provide protection from violence differ greatly from those engaged in environmental protection. To link organized violence and environmental habitability might create a conceptual confusion, leading to a “militarization of our thinking about the relationship between humanity and environment (Graeger, 1996:111).

Deudney further argues that there is a risk of stirring up unhelpful nationalistic feelings. The national security mind set creates an inappropriate “us/them” attitude. The kind of zero-sum thinking characteristic of the national security mind set is simply not appropriate for dealing with environmental protection issues. There is no specific “enemy” as such in the sense of a hostile “other”. If there is a culprit at all, it is “us”.

Environmental Security Approaches: Different School of Thought

There seems to be a problem in securitizing the environment as it remains controversial in many quarters. The traditional military analysts have largely ignored the ideas as security still remains a conservation realist account. At least three distinct components of the environmental security spectrum can be identified.

- (i) The first group is composed of military security specialists who have become aware of environmental issues in the form of resources scarcity problem. This group has simply focused on natural resources as a potential course of future interstate conflict and war. The Toronto School” (Homer Dixon, 1994), associated with Thomas Homer-Dixon has sought empirical evidence for this kind of environmental security approach. The Toronto school puts emphasis on the links between renewable resource scarcity and violent conflict. It concentrates upon issues such as scarcities

of cropland, forest, fish stocks and water. The concept of environmental scarcity as defined by the Toronto School of thought is of three types:

- (a) Supply-induced scarcity is caused by degradation and depletion of an environmental resource for example, the erosion of cropland.
- (b) Demand-induced scarcity results from population growth within a region or increased per capita consumption of resources, either of which heightens the demands for a resource.
- (c) Structural scarcity arises from an unequal social distribution of a resource that concentrates it in the hands of a relatively few people, while the remaining population suffers from serious shortages (Homer-Dixon and Blitt, 1998).

What is interesting of the Toronto school is how environmental scarcities contribute to violence in developing countries? This Toronto School tries to draw from a wide range of case studies that under certain circumstances, scarcities of renewable resources, such as cropland and water, do produce conflict instability. They further argue that environmental scarcity rarely contributes directly to interstate conflict, though the 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras is described by Homer-Dixon as “a first class example of an ecologically driven conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1991:76).

The Toronto school are of the opinion that how alarmed the international community should be about the linkage between environmental issues and national and international conflict. Environmental issues often play much more than a minimal role in the generation of conflicts, but at the same time they should not be over-sectionalized or exaggerated in their effect (Homer-Dixon and Blitt, 1998:1). The lasting contribution of the Toronto school has made an important and extremely valuable contribution in terms of their detailed empirical research into case studies that is characteristic of their approach, for example, the contribution water shortages to political violence and feelings of social and political alienation in the Gaza Strip (Kelly and Homer-Dixon, 1998).

The second group of thought is the Swiss Peace Foundations Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP). Environmental conflicts are defined in the project as traditional conflicts that are induced or sparked by environmental degradation (Libiszewski S., 1992). Maldevelopment (associated with increases in poverty and inequity, natural resources over exploitation, environmental degradation) and environmental discrimination (when access to natural capital for certain groups is systematically restricted by the conscious activities of distinct and often powerful

actors with control over those environmental resources) were as factors contributing to violent conflicts.

ENCOP identified contexts that were most susceptible to environmentally following: dry lands, mountain areas with low-land versus high-land interactions, transboundary river basins, areas degraded by dams and mines, tropical forests, and sprawling metropolises. ENCOP research linked these susceptible contexts to the triggering factors of maldevelopment and environmental discrimination to generate seven major types of conflict in which environmental stresses play a role, even if not necessarily the primary or predominate one: ethno political conflicts, demographically caused migration conflicts, international water conflicts and global environmental conflicts, such as ozone depletion and global warming (Baechler, 1998).

The third school of thought is expounded Paul Collier and A. Hoeffler, first at the World Bank and then as leaders of an Oxford University research project, was it is argued that natural resource abundance rather scarcity was critical to the incidence of civil war. They proposed that, holding the level of grievance constant, more rebellions are likely in countries with an abundance of natural resources. These natural resources are often an aim and sometimes the primary goal of emergent movements. The looking of natural resources is hypothesized to be pivoted in financing, for military purchases of arms, labor and food (Paul Collier and A. Hoeffler, 2000).

Several environmental and human rights groups supported this “honey pot” perspective in their own research and analysis, for example, on cases of conflict over diamonds (Renner M, 2002). Some researchers have found that the implementation on of peace arguments is likely to be more difficult in countries abundant in natural resources (Stedman S., 2001). While others have suggested that natural resources dependence poses difficulties in post war peace building efforts (Doyle M. Sambanis N., 2000).

The conclusion which emerges from the above debate within different school of thought is that environmental domain lends itself to a post realist approach to security because, as Jessica Matthews noted in 1989, many of the key issues are regional or even global in scope and cannot be neatly confined by sovereign territorial boundaries, so that traditional realist approaches to international relations distort, misunderstand, or ignore them (Matthews, 1989).

In determining whether or not the environment is truly a security issue, the element of threat is important. To state this in another way as Neville Brown has put it, just as

the threat of attack constituted the main reason for employing security strategies in the past, so continuing acts of environmental degradation can be seen to present “ecological threats to stability and peace” (Brown, 1989). In the worst-case of this kind of thinking, environmental collapse is equated with the effects of a nuclear holocaust, producing a total breakdown of the natural system.

Environmental peacebuilding: broadening the environment and security program.

Since of the beginning of this decade and the last, the apocalyptic warnings of water wars and environmental refugees have been slowly giving way to a growing hopes that the environment more specifically, environmental cooperation could prompts stability and peace between states in conflict. According to this theory, initiatives such as transboundary co-operation for environmental conservation (e.g., “peace parks”), international river basin management, regional marine agreements, and joint environmental monitoring programs could enhance co-operation between communities and countries (Alexander Carius, 2000).

Some scholars have increasingly focused their attention on the potential for using environmental threats as a common aversion to stimulate conflict resolution and collaborative behavior towards longer-term peace. This is possible by identifying the conditions under which environmental cooperation best facilitates conflict transformation and peace building, and which forms of negotiation or state holder participation have been particularly successful.

Approches To Environmental Peacebuilding

Most ecological peace initiatives fall into one of three partly overlapping categories (Carius & Dabelko, 2004; Conca, Carius & Dabelko, 2005).

- Initiatives to prevent conflicts that are directly related to the environment;
- Efforts to initiate and sustain a dialogue on transboundary environmental cooperation between parties to a conflict; and.
- Initiatives that seeks 2 lasting peace by promoting conditions for sustainable development.

Preventing conflict directly related to the environment:

Environmental cooperation could play a role in preventing violence that erupts due to the uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources, the destruction of ecosystem or the devastation of livelihoods based on natural resources. Most of the research

that establishes a link between environment degradation and violent conflict focuses on two solutions: reducing the pressure on resources on which people are economically dependent; and strengthening the institutional capacities to respond to environmental challenges.

Environmental cooperation could also help assuage the anger of victims of environmental injustice, who are often already socially and economically disadvantaged. Latent environmental problems may combine with material insecurity and perceived marginalization to create an explosive situation, especially where ethnic identity determines access to political and economic opportunities. The most heavily polluted industrial regions in the post-Soviet Baltic States, for instance, have a largely ethnic Russian population, generating a volatile mix of burgeoning ethnic and national identity, mounting social discrimination, and environmental mismanagement. Active environmental cooperation could help alleviate an important source of this festering discontent.

Using Environmental Cooperation as a Platform for Dialogue

A second approach to environmental peace building seeks to address conflicts that have no specific environmental cause. These initiatives attempt to create peace by bringing conflicting parties together to reach cooperative solutions to common environmental challenges. Countries have found that environmental issues are one of the few topics on which they can sustain an ongoing dialogue.

One of the most complex, unresolved conflicts in the highly unstable Caucasus region is Armenia and Azerbaijan's dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. In the fall of 2000, the government of Georgia convinced Armenia and Azerbaijan to set up a trilateral biosphere reserve in the southern Caucasus region. Although Armenia and Azerbaijan are not yet ready to cooperate directly with each other, the agreement calls for them to create national biosphere reserves, which will ultimately be integrated into a single conservation area. A similar attempt has been made in Kashmir, over which India and Pakistan have been fighting since the end of British colonial rule, some international environmentalists have proposed establishing a peace park in the Karakoram mountains lying between India and Pakistan in the joint management of this unique glacial region-in which more soldiers are estimated to have died from the cold and altitude than from enemy fire (Haider, 2005)-could help defuse this deadly border conflict.

Promoting Sustainable Development To Achieve A Durable Peace

A third approach is based on the premise that long-term and comprehensive sustainability is a prerequisite for a lasting peace. The joint management of shared

resources can be not only a way to keep both parties talking, but also the key to negotiating a resolution. For example, even if water scarcity is not the cause of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, a solution to their shared water problem is necessary for a peaceful resolution.

Making Environmental Peacemaking A Reality

Environmental peacemaking initiative can also reduce tension and violent conflict between countries which can bring about tangible environmental, economic, and political gains. Environmental peacemaking strategy offer the chance to craft a positive, practical policy framework for cooperation that can engage a broad community of stakeholders by combining environment, development and peace related concern.

Government and other actors have not pursued enough peace-oriented cooperative activities on environmental problems. It is only in few occasions they have just begun to share experience and knowledge about environmental peacemaking through peace-and-conflict assessments of environmental projects and programs. Without such knowledge, the international community's may be missing powerful peacemaking opportunities in the environmental domain.

The challenge, before the international community, is to gather evidence-however partial and indirect-that more aggressive environmental peacemaking strategy could create opportunities. This might be used to make governments, inter-governmental organizations, social movements, and other actors to be more aggressive about environmental co-operation and peacemaking.

A novel way to build environmental peace building in the twenty-first century is globalization. Although its effects are complex and by no means entirely healthy for ecological sustainability, but globalization has the ability to move political dynamics out of narrow interstate settings and into a broader society-to-society context is an important and healthy sign. This new social space holds much of the potential for environmental peacemaking. It is well worth finding out whether these changes create opportunities to build peace, lessen environmental insecurity, and break of the zero-sum logic that often plagues international relations (Conca, Carius and Dabelko, 2005 :157).

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Conceptualizing Human Security

Ajay Kumar Yadav

The notion of security has always remained a major concern of civilization, and arguably, one of its root causes. One of the main reasons people initially began forming groups was for the protection from outside threats. With the Westphalia convention of 1648,¹ however, the term nation-state emerged and the concept of security became a central political issue. After this convention, the state became the central agent responsible for ensuring the security of its people. In *Leviathan*, written in 1651, John Hobbes wrote that “fear and I were born twins” to convey the pervasive sense of insecurity that was among in Briton during that time. John Locke, in his book *Two Treatises on Government* written in 1690, purports that, indeed, the state fulfils its social contract with its citizens by protecting their natural rights, foremost of which is security. And if the state does not fulfill this duty, the civilians have the right to terminate the social contract and establish and new agreement. With the rise of modern nation-states, the idea of security became synonymous with establishing territorial integrity and protecting borders from outside threats and creating sustainable peace within.

Post World War, with the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, a new commitment to the procurement of global peace, through international cooperation and the promotion of human rights, emerges. The Declaration of Human Rights, enacted in 1948, is major incident that directly relates to the concept of human security.

Throughout the Cold War, however, the notion of human security was minimized and the world was divided into two blocks, led by the communist Soviet Union and the capitalist United States. During this time the concept of collective security, consisting of an entire region and its allies, became prominent and is illustrated by the establishment of such international bodies as North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and agreements like the Warsaw Pact . Both blocks were motivated by the realist view of international political systems and, as such, were intent on accumulating increasing power. During this time small nations were forced to build alliances with one of the two major powers in order to protect their national existence

from the other power. This period placed less attention on the individual and focused on national security.

In the 1960s, the term security is first connected with the emerging ideas of development. United States Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara wrote that "security is development and without development, there can be no security...development means economic, social and political progress"(MacNamara 1968: 149-150).

The end of the Cold War in the 1990s saw the birth of many challenges to the modern nation-state, including insurgencies, migration, ethnic conflicts and genocide. These challenges, further exacerbated by the advent of related technology, forced nations to no longer solely define their sense of security by the power of their national military. In fact, the Brandt Report explained that:

"An important task of constructive international policy will have to consist in providing a new, more comprehensive understanding of 'security' which would be less restricted to the purely military aspects. In the global context, true security cannot be achieved by a mounting build-up of weapons – defense in the narrow sense – but only by providing basic conditions for peaceful relations between nations, and solving not only the military but also the non-military problems which threaten them" (North-South: A Programme for Survival, 1980:124).

International economist Mahbub ul Haq furthered this notion and transferred the importance away from national security by founding the concept of human development and basing a nation's progress on the human development index. Mahbub UI Haq expressed the need for a new concept of security, one that reflects the lives of individual people instead of the weapons of their countries. This definition, he believed was universal, global, and simultaneously individual. In 1994 the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) focused their annual publication, the Human Development Report, on the theme of human security and defined the term as 'Human security is the sense that people are free from worries, not merely from the dread of a cataclysmic world even but primarily about daily life. Human security is people centered while being tuned to two different aspects: it means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the patterns of daily life- whether in homes, in jobs, or in communities'(Khosla, 2003).

Human security, in its present understanding, is a multifaceted concept but is based on the freedom from fear and freedom from want. The term is contextual and manifests differently in the developed world than it does in the developing world. In wealthy nations, human security refers to concepts like unemployment, the spread of deadly diseases like HIV/AIDS, drugs and drug related violence, crime, environmental threats like soil degradation and rising levels of pollution, mental health, and terrorism. The developing world's experience with human security would include many of the above hazards but also contain the lack of basic human needs such as hunger, water, shelter, basic infrastructure, energy, education, sanitation, and health.

The UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 identified seven threats to human security, which consist of economic insecurity, food insecurity, health insecurity, environmental insecurity, personal insecurity, community insecurity, and political insecurity. It was held that human security can be achieved only through human development and the greater democratization of human society. Since 1994, additional components have been included to the notion of human security such as the right to education, freedom from gender discrimination, the mitigation of the harmful effects of globalization, sustainable population growth, the oversight of migration and refugee populations, and the safe regulation of drugs.

A final element of human security that is often overlooked is mental security. This concept takes into consideration the psychology of insecurity and claims the right of all people to be free to pursue their own course in life without interference or obstruction. Mental security is especially critical in developing areas with high rates of poverty because of the way in which impoverished people are often robbed of their dignity and prohibited from full participation in society. The disempowerment of people because of their social status violates basic human needs and further encourages the participation in unlawful acts. A person who does not feel mentally secure is more likely to be involved in crime, corruption, or, perhaps worse, the full withdrawal from society. As such mental insecurity should be viewed as a grave threat to human security, on equal terms as freedom from hunger or disease.

In 2005 Annan (2005) said that the UN's three key goals were security, development and human rights. These three goals were basic points of a new idea of security that emphasized the freedom from want (a shared vision of development), freedom from fear (a vision of collective security) and freedom to live in dignity (under the rule of law, human rights and democracy) (Brauch, 2008: 19).

In the UN system at least three different security concepts coexist. The Hobbesian concept focuses on the political and military dimension of national security. The extended Grotian concept aims at “cooperative security” that includes economic, societal and environmental security dimensions and the “human security” approach that been promoted by the Human Security Network (HSN), the Commission on Human Security (CHS 2003) and by the Secretary-General (Annan 2005; Brauch, 2008: 21).

Human security literature often reads like an uneasy merger of human development and peace themes, often using the term ‘security’ as a bridge: “human security joins the main agenda items of peace, security and development”. In fact, the human security discourse does more.(Gasper, 2005:222) Amartya Sen who was the co chair of the report in 2003 clearly intends something more here by ‘security’ than merely stability; such as removal of intolerable risks. An x% fall in income for a rich person and for a poor person is not the same experience. His phrase ‘downturn with security’, introduced to partner the conventional aspiration of ‘growth with equity’, might not avoid this danger if security is equated to stability (Ibid).

David Roberts (2006) argues that in focusing on defining human security, analysts have conceptualized phenomena the wrong way around. He advocates for the focus to move to notions of human insecurity as defined by-

avoidable civilian deaths, global in reach, that are caused by changeable human built social, political, economic, cultural, or belief structures, created, inhabited and operated by other civilians whose work or conduct, indirectly and/or directly, unintentionally, unnecessarily and avoidably causes needless mortality around the world. (258, emphasis added) (Grayson, 2008:390).

Human security, although having roots in the minds and works of Gandhi and Galtung, has found more recent exposure in the academic and policy literature to the extent that realists have entered the debate around the term, if only to challenge the utility and practicality of such a broad conceptualization. The promotional literature attending the online launch of this document, prior to paper publication by Oxford University Press in November 2005, described the report’s interpretation of human security as focusing on ‘any form of political violence’. Deaths of children under the age of five (U5IMR: Under-Five Infant-Mortality Rate) from factors such as tuberculosis, starvation, lack of clean drinking water, diarrhoea or malaria, for

example, will be included. Galtung's conceptualization of violence as the main determinants of human insecurity and the main cause of avoidable civilian death around the world (Galtung, 1969: 167–169; June, Roberts, 2006: 249-261).

A prominent argument against necessity of incorporating Human Security will be a simple one. Why is this new perspective necessary? Well-established concepts of poverty, inequality, human rights, and conflict resolution and prevention are widely used in current debates on the impact of globalization on human well-being. Furthermore, the concept of Human Security entails fundamentally altering the way that we look at the problems of underdevelopment and the factors that lead to it. Human security shares with poverty, human development, and human rights a concern with protecting 'the vital core' of human life. But while poverty and human rights are concepts that focus on absolute levels of deprivation, human security focuses on the risks of sudden change for the worse. Risks of sudden change for the worse — whether financial market contagion or the spread of mad cow disease — are aggravated in the age of globalization. These threats affect not only those who are 'poor', but also those who are 'affluent'. Understanding the human impact of globalization from the human security perspective requires a different agenda — of monitoring not only low levels, but also sudden changes. Thus, a policy agenda would focus on not only development, but also on early warning and prevention (Fukuda-Parr, 2003:171).

Examples of a developing research agenda, and gaps in research, include the link between socioeconomic inequality, divided societies, and civil conflict/ violence; the link between AIDS, underdevelopment, and violent conflict; the link between human rights abuse, poverty, and migration; the link between international economic fluctuations, domestic economic disruptions, social dislocation, and violent conflict; the link between international commodity markets and civil war; the link between transnational drug markets, corruption in governance, and poverty; the link between literacy rates and birth rates; and the link between women's/girls' education and development. The issue areas that could benefit from a fresh analysis from a human security perspective are almost endless, and not uncontroversial. Arms sales and transfers; globalization; population policy; trade and human rights; poverty and hunger; gender; children in conflict; technology transfer and medical patents; bioengineering; environment issues; and refugees/human displacement are just some of the areas that can no longer be approached in isolation from the linkages to wider layers of security (Newman, 2001:249-50).

The threat of terrorism to national security has become a primary concern of the international community over the last decade. In this context, it is necessary to see what differences have the human security and the gender approaches made in the same period of time. Human security analysis argues that development is not possible without security and supports the idea of sustainable development as opposed to development as mere growth. It advocates labour standards and rights as part of growth (Chenoy, 2009:48).

In turn, there is an argument that we cannot meaningfully consider human security without discussing gender inequality first; that “women’s empowerment is a precondition for human security” (Haq, 1999:95-108; Tickner, 1999:41-58; Newman, 2001:247). Women, in most societies, face more insecurities than men. They are usually placed at the bottom layer in all societies and accorded limited opportunities in terms of access to critical resources such as institutional credit, land ownership, education, employment and wages. Women head around 21% of rural households in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, but they own less than 2% of land globally and enjoy access to only 10% of credit funds available worldwide. Such gender inequalities exist because of the absence of appropriate national legislations as well as customary laws that discriminate against women (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 81–2). Hard security issues, such as war and environmental damage, affect women more directly than men. Although men usually fight wars, women and children become the casualties of war. Women and children also constitute some 80% of the total refugees of the world (Tickner, 1995: 190–2). The predicament of women demands that their experiences be taken into consideration while formulating security policies (Nuruzzaman, 2006: 296-97).

Women of All Ages bear the burden of armed conflict and are affected by war both directly and indirectly (Gardam & Charlesworth, 2000: 148-166). The direct effects include victimization through acts of murder, terrorism, torture and rape, while the indirect effects include displacement, loss of home or property, family separation and disintegration, poverty, and illness (Ashford & Huet-Vaughn, 1997:186-97; Denov, 2006:319).

For example, during the eleven-year civil war in Sierra Leone (1991–2002), sexual violence was committed on a much larger scale than the highly visible amputations for which Sierra Leone became notorious. Throughout the civil war, thousands of women and girls of all ages, ethnic groups and socio-economic classes were subjected to widespread and systematic sexual violence, mostly by rebel forces. In

2002, Physicians for Human Rights (2002) conducted a survey of female heads of households in communities of displaced persons. The organization calculated that as many as 215,000 to 257,000 Sierra Leonean women and girls may have been subjected to sexual violence during the conflict period.⁴ Moreover, thousands of Sierra Leonean women and girls were abducted by rebel forces and confined among their ranks for long periods of time (Denov, 2006:319).

Feminists and women's movements are deeply concerned with structural violence as purported by Johan Galtung, since it impacts women directly in their daily lives and holds them back from participating fully in institutions, even when there are opportunities for participation. Women's movements the world over have lobbied for steps to stop the use of rape as a weapon of war. It was not until sexual atrocities were committed during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia that consistent references began to appear throughout the UN regarding the problem of sexual violence during armed conflict. The 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna was a watershed for women's human rights, as previously these acts had been regarded as private matters and were therefore not seen as appropriate for government or international action (UN 2000; Chenoy, 2009:45).

Feminist scholars define security in light of the circumstances and needs of people and stress that 'security is not just the absence of threats or acts of violence, but the enjoyment of economic and social justice' (Steans, 1998: 127). Security includes absence of the threat of unemployment, elimination of all forms of discrimination and the provision for safe working conditions. Security also means that all individuals have access to food and other economic provisions that provide them with a standard livelihood (Nuruzzaman, 2006:297).

This comprehensive definition of security, of course, recognizes that the security of individuals depends on their respective economic, political, social and personal circumstances across societies. Thus, issues of poverty, inequality, mal-development and a denial of basic needs are relevant to understanding security. The state-centric realist security paradigm is far from resolving these issues and cannot ensure security of the vulnerable groups, particularly of women. Realists insist on security preparation through armaments build-up that depends on huge military expenditures. In most cases, huge military spending impacts on women and threatens their security. An increase in military spending may mean a contraction of social spending in areas of health, education and support to low income groups. As its consequence, female-headed households are likely to suffer most. The move towards increased military spending also complicates the issue of inequality between men and women, because women are less employed in military hardware-producing industries, and those

who are employed are paid less compared to men (Steans, 1998: 110–12). Feminists believe that true security can be achieved through the elimination of gender inequality and the abolition of boundary distinctions between men and women, the powerful and the weak (Tickner, 1995: 193; Nuruzzaman, 2006:297).

The distinction between national security and human security can be phrased in terms of who is being protected, from whom, is that person being protected, who is providing the protection, how is protection being provided and which values of security are being emphasized? At the national level the state is the central body in need of protection and other nations are the threat. In regards to human security, however, the individual citizens are the ones in need of protection the state itself, non-state actors, nature, and globalization are all held to be threats. National security values territorial integrity and national sovereignty, whereas human security prioritizes human experiences such as freedom, safety, and opportunity.

All proponents of human security agree that its primary goal is the protection of individuals. But consensus breaks down over what threats individuals should be protected from. Proponents of the 'narrow' concept of human security, which underpins the *Human Security Report*, focus on violent threats to individuals, while recognizing that these threats are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity and various forms of socio-economic and political inequity. Proponents of the 'broad' concept of human security articulated in the UN Development Programme's 1994, *Human Development Report*, and the Commission on Human Security's 2003 report, *Human Security Now*, argue that the threat agenda should be broadened to include hunger, disease and natural disasters because these kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined.

Endnotes:

- 1 The European settlements of 1648, which brought to an end the 'Eighty Years' War' between Spain and the Dutch and the German phase of the 'Thirty Years' War'. The peace was negotiated, from 1644, in the Westphalian towns of Münster and Osnabrück. Peace of Westphalia signed at Munster on Oct. 24, 1648, bringing peace by recognizing the rulers' sovereignty within their lands and their right to determine to religious beliefs of their subjects. (*World Almanac, 2009, p. 178*) The Peace of Westphalia recognized the full territorial sovereignty of the member states of the empire. They were empowered to contract treaties with one another and with foreign powers, provided that the emperor and the empire suffered no prejudice. By this and other changes the princes of the empire became absolute sovereigns in their own dominions.
- 2 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military alliance of twenty-six countries from Europe and North America that is based on the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. The quintessential example of a collective defense system.
- 3 On May 14, 1955, with the signing of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union formed its own alliance to counterbalance NATO. The Warsaw Pact was officially dissolved at a meeting in Prague on 1 July 1991.

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Realist Views on the Realities of the Post-Cold War International System

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This paper seeks to analyse the realist interpretation of the post-cold war realities like globalisation and terrorism but before that dwells on the realist position and their evolution regarding the post-cold war polarity and its own theoretical contribution of the balance of power theory which was largely predicted to play a very important role in the aftermath of Soviet disintegration. Thus it seeks to undertake an examination of the realist theory in dealing with its very assumptions and how it has evolved new concepts and ways in dealing with the situation at hand.

Realism as a tradition of thought and an approach to analyse the international system has dominated the realm of international politics but it is not a monolithic entity in itself. There are different schools within the realist approach which are based on the same core assumptions but still have differences over how this international system operates or how would it unfold in the upcoming times. Realist tradition itself has seen its evolution and refinement with the changing course of time leading to what we see as a division between classical, structural variants of it. However this division between classical realism and structural realism no longer fully captures the complexity of the contemporary debate among realists. Some of the most important debates are between different variants of structural realism. This has manifested itself in the divergence of views that realist school presents on the aspects of international politics. The end of bipolar world with the end of the cold war opened up a whole new debate regarding the upcoming structure of international system as perceived by the realists and thus realists came up with their own predictions about the post-cold war international system basically focussing on the kind of polarity this era was to witness (i.e., the kind of distribution of power) and its associated corollary was the prediction regarding the balance of power in theory and practice. In fact these two concepts, viz. the distribution of power in the system or polarity and the balance of power form the two very essential hallmarks of realist thought which have important bearing on the kind of international system

at any period of time. While on the one hand these two concepts witnessed a lot of debate surrounding them, the international system was marked by two other very important phenomena which incorporated themselves as essential features of international system almost at the same period of time, viz. globalization and terrorism on which realists didn't speak as exigently. The purpose of this paper is thus, to undertake a detour of the realist thinking on these key features of the international system and to see them in the comparative light in order to make an assessment regarding the extent to which the prominent realists in particular and realism as a whole has been able to predict and explain the post-cold war international system. The first section of the paper would deal with the views of prominent realist scholars regarding the polarity of the international system which will be followed in logical continuation in the second section with the realists views on the formation of balances or in other words about the balance of power as a phenomenon and as a concept, its evolution and the various realists contention on this core realist conception. The next section seeks to deal with the realist views on the two ubiquitous phenomena of the post-cold war era, viz. globalization and terrorism.

Realism and post-cold war polarity in the international system:

To start with, we will take Waltz (1993), who uses neorealist theory to assess how the international order was evolving in the aftermath of the cold war. He focuses on how the structure of the international system was changing after the cold war. Waltz (1993) says writing in the immediate aftermath that the world remains bipolar for now, because Russia could still tend to itself militarily, and because no other great power had emerged till then; however he claimed that bipolarity would soon be altered because the United States would no longer be balanced by any other country. In such circumstances, balance of power theory predicted that other countries would strive to hold the US in check. The existence of preponderant U.S. power was said to be motivating other countries to distance themselves from the United States. In the absence of a Soviet threat, Waltz puts very emphatically that "NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are" (Waltz 1993:75-6). In the longer run, other countries would rise to great-power status so that "for a country to choose not to become a great power is a structural anomaly" (Waltz 1993:24). Thus Waltz (1993) predicted that the emerging world would eventually have four or five great powers.

Mearshimer (1990) drawing upon structural realism analyses the implications of the changing international distribution of power and gives a pessimistic view of Europe's future in the post-cold war era. He cites two reasons for Europe having seen peaceful times in the past 45 years: bipolar systems tend to be peaceful, and

the presence of nuclear weapons had induced general caution. If the Soviet Union and the United States withdraw from Europe, he argues, Europe will devolve to multipolarity, and a renewed era of wars and major crises may erupt on that continent. (Brown et al. 1995) Although others believed that European peace and stability will be preserved because of economic interdependence and the notion that democracies do not fight each other, or because war will become obsolescent among industrialized countries, Mearshimer (1990) refutes these theories and warns against more European countries seeking nuclear arsenals if the superpowers withdraw which if not managed carefully would create new risks of major crises and wars.

Similarly, Christopher Layne (1993) applies the neorealist theory to the future of international politics and argues that the unipolar world is only a passing phase as the rise of new powers was inevitable. Neorealism thus advanced the claim that states would balance against the potential hegemon by working up on their own power and by establishing alliances. Layne supports these predictions by citing the example of two in two “unipolar moments” in the history of international politics, viz., French predominance in the late seventeenth century and British hegemony during “Pax Britannica” of the mid-nineteenth century. Thus he concluded that the U.S. strategy of trying to retain international primacy was unlikely to succeed, and he suggests an alternate grand strategy aimed at protecting U.S. interests in the inevitable transition to a multipolar world which according to him was occur most likely to take place between 2000 and 2010.

All the three scholars thus argued that unipolarity won't last long in the aftermath of the cold war in the international system. Classic balance-of-power theory, which lies at the heart of neorealism, contends that states tend to band together to offset the power of the largest member of the system in order to guarantee their own security. Given that the United States was clearly the strongest power in the world at the end of the Cold War, it was believed that the other states would, overtime, begin to balance against it. “Unipolar systems contain the seeds of their own demise,” wrote Layne (1993:7), because “states balance against hegemon.” The nature of US hegemony (whether it be hostile or benign) will make little difference because uncertainty is a constant feature of the system. Given that no state can be sure of the intentions of another; smaller states will never be convinced that those of the United States are nonthreatening. “Over time,” wrote Waltz (1993:79), unbalanced power will be checked by the responses of the weaker who will, rightly or not, feel put upon.” Thus, the consensus among these authors prevailed that the so-called unipolar moment was just that, a moment, “a geopolitical interlude that will give

way to multipolarity between 2000–2010” (Layne 1993:7). In a related point, all three authors felt that the rise of a multipolar system was “inevitable,” given the structure of the system (Layne 1993:45). Irresistible pressure is placed on states to maximize their potential power by the self-help, anarchical international system. As Layne (1993:9) has explained, eligible states that fail to maximize their power and “attain great power status are predictably punished.” States with the potential to be great powers but choose not to do so are “structural anomalies,” according to Waltz (1993:59), not the rule. “For that reason, the choice is a difficult one to sustain. Sooner or later, usually sooner, the international status of countries has risen in step with their material resources” (Waltz 1993:59). Despite the reluctance of neorealism to predict individual state decisions, these authors identified a number of states that seemed to be the strongest candidates for emergence as great powers based on empirical measurements of their potential. China was prominently mentioned by all three. Layne (1993:37, 38) argued that Germany was “beginning to exert its leadership,” and Japan was “beginning to seek (Mearsheimer, *The False Promise of International Institutions* 1994/1995) strategic autonomy.” Russia would surely recover and seek to reassert itself. Mearsheimer (1990) mentioned Great Britain, France, and suggested may be even Italy. The exact number of new poles would be determined over time, but no matter what that number turned out to be, these authors argued that it was “certain that . . . multipolarity will emerge in the new European order” (Mearsheimer 1990:31)

Realism and Balance Of Power in the post-cold war era:

Balance of Power theory faces difficulties in the contemporary period. In the early 1990s as discussed above many scholars used this theory to argue that the post-cold war bipolarity would result into multipolarity. But with very little evidence to suggest the rise of traditional balancing against the US, even a number of realists now question the key aspects of balance of power theory. But many scholars instead of calling for the abandonment of this theory called for the expansion of the concept of balancing through such categories as soft balancing (Pape 2005) and asymmetric balancing (Paul 2005).

As we saw, in the first section, the important neorealists of the time used balance of power logic to predict multipolarity through a transitory phase of unipolarity. But when traditional forms of balancing didn’t come to be viewed for long and the American unipolar moment seemed to last long, different realist scholars came up with their variegated explanations for this phenomenon.

T.V Paul (2005:47) argues that since the end of the Cold War, second-tier major powers such as China, France, Germany, India, and Russia have mostly abandoned traditional “hard balancing”-based on countervailing alliances and arms build-ups at the systemic level. This does not mean, however, that they are helplessly watching the resurgence of U.S. power. These states have forgone military balancing primarily because they do not fear losing their sovereignty and existential security to the reigning hegemon, a necessary condition for such balancing to occur. Nevertheless, second-tier major powers-barring the United Kingdom-are concerned about the increasing unilateralism of the United States and its post-September 11 tendency to intervene militarily in sovereign states and forcibly change regimes that pursue anti-U.S. policies (such as Iraq). In this new environment, the second-ranking states are taking steps-including bandwagoning, buck-passing, and free-riding-both to constrain U.S. power and to maintain their security and influence. They have also begun to engage in “soft balancing,” which involves the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes, especially at the United Nations, with the implicit threat of upgrading their alliances if the United States goes beyond its stated goals.

On the similar lines, Robert Anthony Pape (2003) argues for the major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behaviour against the United States. In the near term, France, Germany, Russia, China, Japan, and other important regional states are unlikely to respond with traditional hard-balancing measures, such as military build-ups, war-fighting alliances, and transfers of military technology to U.S. opponents. Directly confronting U.S. preponderance is too costly for any individual state and too risky for multiple states operating together, at least until major powers become confident that members of a balancing coalition will act in unison. Instead, major powers are likely to adopt what he calls “soft-balancing” measures: that is, actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies. Soft balancing using international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements has already been a prominent feature of the international opposition to the U.S. war against Iraq.

This above description suggests that with the anticipation of balancing against the U.S. as the sole power or pole, the concept of balancing was expanded to include efforts which didn't include hard military balancing or forging of alliances. However, realists like Stephen G Brooks and William Curti Wohlforth argue that “although states do periodically undertake actions that end up constraining the United States, the soft-balancing argument does not help to explain this behaviour. There is no

empirical basis for concluding that U.S. power, and the security threat that potentially inheres in it, has influenced recent constraint actions undertaken by the other major powers.” (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005:75)

Thus in the post-cold war era when the balancing didn't happen in its classical sense unlike predicted by many structural realists adhering to 'the balance of power' logic, many new realist scholars rather than disproving this theory and practice came up with the broadened conception of balancing and at the same time other realists disagreed with this broadened conception. Thus realism here reflects diverse stances even in case of a concept which is at its very central analysis.

Realism and Globalization:

The post-cold war era was marked by the triumph of capitalism, neo-liberal ideology with the fall of Soviet Union and simultaneous assertion of globalization as an established fact for many parts of the world. It saw growing interconnectedness among the economies, transnational flows of capital, information and services like never seen before. Places on the globe that were formerly excluded from the full force of global capitalism, global communications, and global cultural intrusions have much more become parts of these networks than at any previous time. A point of debate about globalization is regarding the fact that whether it should be regarded as an element of continuity between the cold war and post-cold war orders or a point of departure or systemic change. Realists have consistently held that the continuities in international relations are more important than the changes, and this is found problematic in the present age of globalization. A common preoccupation of much contemporary writing about world politics concerns the dynamic interrelation between continuity and change. The end of the Cold War, the intensification of globalization and the 'postmodern turn' has delivered powerful challenges to the orthodoxy of realism. Another issue regarding this phenomenon is about the claims of the demise of Westphalian state system made owing to the kind of 'borderless world' talks in a world where international institutions, other non-state actors like MNCs are determining the pattern of interactions even between the states. In view of these questions raised by globalization, realism which is based on the state-centric assumption seems not to take this phenomenon as much of importance as to consider it even as an outstanding feature of the post-cold war era. Waltz (1993:61) argues against the prevalent notion of globalization making states powerless in managing the stability of their economies, rather through the example of Japan he refutes this point and puts forward his views that to manage globalization, leading states would most likely strengthen their economic influence over states on which

they depend or to which they are closely connected. According to him in such a scenario, incentives to compete are strong whose likely outcome would be seen in the form of a set of great powers forming their regional bases in Asia, Europe, and America. He also makes a mention that if NAFTA succeeds, the US will be at the centre of the world's largest economic bloc. Countries and regions that lag in the race will become more and more dependent on others. Waltz (1993:63) also makes a point that the distinction between high politics and low politics is misplaced and in the contemporary period no state can hope to sustain a world role without a considerable economic capability.

These points made by Waltz clearly point towards the fact that realism, more precisely its structural variant though doesn't think that globalization changes the game of the international politics as claimed by many hyperglobalists but they definitely concede the growing importance of economic factors. As Waltz suggested in another article, 'the terms of political, economic and military competition are set by the larger units of the international political system' (Waltz 2000:53). Waltz recognizes that globalization presents new policy challenges for nation-states but he denies that the state is being pushed aside by new global actors. According to him the state remains the primary force in international relations and has expanded its power to effectively manage the process of globalization.

What neorealists are concerned with are the new security challenges presented by globalization. Most neorealists assume that conditions of anarchy and competition accentuate the concerns for absolute and relative gains in the era of globalization. They point towards the uneven nature of globalization which can accentuate the existing differences in societies, creating situations for conflicts.

Globalization witnessed the proliferation of international financial institutions and regimes and other transnational institutions of governance which are claimed by institutionalists to cause peace. Neoliberal theorists suggested that transnationalism and complex interdependence of the 1970s (Keohane and Nye 1972: 1977) would make the world more pluralistic in terms of the actors involved in international interactions and that these actors would become more dependent on each other which would ultimately lead to decline in the efficacy of military force as a tool of statecraft. However for neorealists the most effective tool of statecraft is still force or the threat of use of force, even in times of globalization. From a neorealist view, states work to establish these regimes and institutions if they serve their interests (absolute gain), and they continue to support them if the cooperative activities

promoted by the institution do not unfairly advantage other states. Mearshimer (1994/95) states in this context that Realists maintain that institutions are basically reflection of the distribution of power in the world. They are based on self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behaviour and therefore realists refute the claim that institutions are an important cause of peace.

Thus realists do not have to situate their theory of world politics in opposition to globalization per se; rather, what they offer is a very different conceptualization of the process. What is important about a realist view on globalization is the claim that even if rudimentary transnational governance is possible as claimed by liberal-institutionalists, it will be entirely dependent on the distribution of power. Given the preponderance of power that the US holds, it is beyond question that it has been one of the foremost proponents of globalization. The core values of globalization-liberalism, capitalism, and consumerism- are exactly those espoused by the US. At a deeper level, realists argue that modernity is not, as liberals hope, dissolving the boundaries of difference among the peoples of the world. (Dunn and Schmidt 2008: 180) From classical realists such as Rousseau to structural realists such as Waltz, protagonists have argued that interdependence is as likely to breed 'mutual vulnerability' as peace and prosperity. And while questioning the extent to which the world has become any more interdependent in relative terms, realists insist that the state is not going to be eclipsed by global forces operating either below or above the nation-state. Nationalism, realists have continuously reminded us, remains a potent force in world politics.

Thus realists don't see globalization as bringing any fundamental change in the world. However they definitely see the implicit power dynamics inherent in the phenomenon which is nothing but a manifestation of the state level power-play and according to realists, even globalization is unable to transcend beyond this reality of inter-state relations which is as dominant as earlier and in fact carved new ways of power politics in the globalization era.

Realism and Terrorism:

Terrorism has indeed acquired global dimensions like never seen before in the post-cold war era. The tendency to incur violence on innocent lives that too by reasons which are politically motivated and with the presence of non-state actors behind them are the common features of terrorism in the current phase. Realism being a tradition which ignores the role of non-state actors, however does not account much importance to this phenomenon per se, though it definitely acknowledges its

implications for the world but not as something which marks a major shift. Stephen Walt says "The attack on the United States did not alter every aspect of world politics, but it did underscore several aspects of U.S. foreign policy that have received insufficient attention in recent years. Understanding these lessons will be essential both to the immediate campaign against al-Qaeda and to any subsequent effort to reduce the overall danger from global terrorism"(Walt 2001-2002).

As Ashley Tellis puts it "The notion that terrorism is mainly aberrant criminal behaviour and not an axial challenge to the international system hinges on at least two interrelated propositions: that the bloodshed inflicted by terrorism is modest and will remain so in comparison to other, particularly organized, forms of violence witnessed within the international system and that terrorists as non-state actors will never acquire the salience that states enjoy in global politics..(Tellis 2004) It is precisely this kind of argument which shapes the realists' position on terrorism.

For realists like John Gray and Kenneth Waltz, 9/11 was not the beginning of a new era in world politics so much as a case of 'business as usual'(Booth and Dunne 2002) what matters most, argues Waltz, are the continuities in the structural imbalance of power in the system and the distribution of nuclear weapons. Thus realists do not attribute much importance to terrorism as it cannot actually change even the stances of the states towards each other and the insecurity posed by it compares not much as that posed by the structural factors inherent in the anarchical nature of international system. According to realists, 9/11 was never going to trigger a new era in governance: the coalition of the willing that was forged in the immediate aftermath was, in Waltz's terms, 'a mile wide', but only 'an inch deep' (Baylis, Smith, Owens, Eds. 2008:104)

After having looked at the broad realists views regarding the four important features of the post-cold war era international system, it can be concluded that while realists in general came up with lots of explanations for the features like polarity and balance of power which were according to them the main determining features of the international system in the post-cold war era though there is no convergence in their views regarding these features. However realists views regarding globalization and terrorism though quite clearly reject the claims made regarding the threatening of the statist paradigm in international relations, it also continues to inhere its basic thrust on the distribution of power and the power politics which they reject is undermined in any manner by these factors. For them the high claims regarding the transcendence of state system and the changing notions of security don't carry much weight.

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